been the haven of the orthodox during the Smalkaldic Wars, and Augsburg the
home of the first Lutheran Confession. But Magdeburg was technically a bisho-
pric, though long a Lutheran city, in which there were only a couple of hund-
red Catholics. And Augsburg was an Imperial city which long had enjoyed Luth-
eran freedom, with its bishop tucked away to administer his lands from out-
side the City. Minden, Verdun, Halberstadt, Hildesheim, and other cities,
principalities and estates too numerous to mention were all threatened with
confiscation and violent conversion. The expulsion of dissenting subjects
has been authorized.

Only a year before, Wallenstein had been quoted as saying that the
Imperial crown should be hereditary. So loud had been the cry of protest from
the Catholic Electors, especially from Maximilian, at the possibility that the
constitution was about to be destroyed, that Ferdinand through the dean of
the Cathedral of Mainz had sent this assurance:

...truly as he desired to look upon the face of God,
he had never had any intention, wish, or thought, and
now had none, of reducing the liberties of the Electors
and Estates of the Roman Empire, or diminishing at all its
constitutional provisions; and if he knew that any one
of his servants or officers cherished such a design, he
would have him beheaded.52

At the same time he sent word to Wallenstein to be more discreet in his re-
marks! One wonders what the 8,000 Lutheran exiles from the city of Augsburg
alone (August, 1629) would have said of the Emperor's desire to see the face
of God!

And what was the Lutheran Elector doing while all of the constitutional
provisions and privileges he held dear were being trampled under foot? What
was he doing while his beloved fellow Lutherans were being driven from house
and home, and while reports reached him daily of Lutheran pastors and their
families starving to death? He was remaining true to his principles, con-
sistent with his Lutheran attitudes. But his patience was wearing thin, and
his idealism was becoming tempered with a measure of cynicism. Wallenstein, for example, assured the Elector's ambassador in November, 1629, that he had no intention of enforcing the Edict of Restitution, and that he would not permit his army to be used for its implementation. But John George refused to believe him and declared that he would believe nothing that Wallenstein said. But still he would not revolt. He did send — and he was the only Elector to do so — a lengthy brief to the Emperor, clearly spelling out the ways in which Ferdinand had violated the basic law of the Empire. But the letter got little more attention than a similar, though shorter outcry from Swabia and Franconia. The time was nevertheless drawing near, when pressed beyond endurance, the Elector would need not just to ask but to answer the question: If the Emperor breaks the law and destroys the constitution, does he thereby forfeit the obedience enjoined on his subjects? The promises, repeated again by Ferdinand, that he had no intention of destroying the Lutheran faith and its adherents was beginning to have a hollow ring in the ears of the Elector. For the refugees, the pleas of the clergy, the outcries of the populace in the south and the northwest of Germany, the army of Wallenstein camped on his own lands, none of these were conducive to continued trust. Who could help but compare what was beginning in Germany with what had already taken place in Bohemia — the refugees of Prague, Lutherans and others, were living in Dresden on the Elector's doorstep.

But he did not rebel. He did not appeal to the King of Sweden for relief, to the King of France for subsidies, to the King of Denmark for his renewed intervention. Can there be a more striking contrast between the character of John George and that of Ferdinand? Was the behavior of Ferdinand consistent with his religious convictions? Certainly it was. Was the behavior of John George still faithful to his religious convictions, and that in spite of the clear and present danger to his House and his co-religionists that
reached its peak in 1629? Certainly it was. Was his behavior consistent? Was it at this point being determined by territorial, dynastic and political considerations? The questions answer themselves.

Germany was in a state of absolute and seemingly irreparable division. The back of the Saxons was beginning to stiffen. The Catholics were at one another's throats, with the Vatican openly hostile to the Hapsburgs in spite of their devotion to the Catholic Reaction; for Urban VIII feared an upsetting of the balance of power between the Hapsburgs and the French, and he feared as well a re-run of the devastation of Rome attempted by the army of Charles V, a fear made the more real by the Mantuan War, within which Germany itself the bishops and the religious orders were squabbling over the spoils of the Edict, as were the representatives of Maximilian and Ferdinand. And all the while the army of Wallenstein was foraging over the countryside, destroying the lands of friends, enemies, and neutrals with reckless abandon, and increasing the tensions between the Catholic Electors and their Emperor, as well as winning the enduring animosity of George William and the Calvinists, and the bitter resentment of John George and the Lutherans. In a desperate attempt to bring some order out of the chaos, the Elector of Mainz invited the Emperor and the Electors to a Kurfürstentag in Regensburg, which lasted from July 20 to November 22 of 1630. Ferdinand had high hopes for the meeting, expecting it to recognize the omnipotence he had proven the year before with the issuance of the Edict. That recognition was to take two forms: the election of his son as King of the Romans, and the voting of support for his army in a proposed alliance with Spain against the Netherlands. But Ferdinand was living in a dream world.

The Kurfürstenrat of Regensburg was the last chance for the Lutherans to say in a constitutional forum what their Elector had been writing to the Emperor to no avail: the land was in ruins, famine and plague were everywhere,
churches were closed, their bells and sacred vessels stolen, the clergy were
dying with their flocks, burgers were begging in the streets, farmers refused
to plant in the spring with soldiers standing ready to steal the harvest,
peasants were robbed and their houses and barns were burned, all security
in money and kind was lost, commerce was at a standstill, taxes and rents
had all but disappeared. And the constitution had been destroyed. With
righteous outrage the ambassador of John George spoke to the Emperor's request
for support of his army at the Kurfürstentag. The answer was an emphatic,
No! The ambassador made three points: 1) the Diets had never asked the
Emperor to raise an army; 2) The Lutherans had no intention of helping to
pay for an army which the Emperor was using to crush them (by enforcing the
Edict); 3) Nor had they any intention of supporting an army whose obvious
goal was the elimination of the German liberties and the destruction of the
constitution. Nor were the Catholic Electors silent. They had had enough
of the predatory Wallenstein, and they demanded his removal, and lamented
that the Emperor had allowed someone from outside the Empire to become a
dictator within it. They wanted a new commander of the army, someone born
in Germany and a member of its Estates, i.e., someone the League could control.

Suddenly the omnipotent Emperor had clay feet. Hoping still to salvage
some support for his alliance and certainly the election of his son, Ferdinand
dismissed Wallenstein on August 13th. But even the dismissal of the General-
issimo did not stem the rising tide of the opposition: both the alliance and
the election were unanimously rejected by the Electors. Nor was that the end
of it. Behind the scenes, the Lutheran Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt had been
seeking a compromise which would save the Empire from disintegration as a re-
sult of the Edict. But his attempts were rejected by the Catholic ecclesiasti-
cal Electors, who insisted on the implementation of the Edict. They neverthe-
less did agree to a "Compositionstag" of all parties in Frankfurt, scheduled
for February, 1631. Having failed to accomplish his own aims, Ferdinand closed the Kurfürstentag without considering changes in the Edict. Germany was sliding at an ever more rapid speed into the abyss. Frightened by Ferdinand's power, Maximilian was moving into an anti-Hapsburg alliance with France. In anguish over the shambles of the constitution and the prospect of a Catholic Reaction autocracy bolstered by Spanish money and men, and/or a Hapsburg-Bourbon collision with Swedish intervention in Germany, John George was moving beyond protest; he was meeting with the Elector of Brandenburg, and calling for a meeting of Protestant princes in Leipzig to consider joint policy before the "Compositionstag" meeting in Frankfurt. At the same time, Gustavus Adolphus had already landed (July 4, 1630) on the Pommeranian coast.

The meeting of the deputies at Frankfurt attempted to deal with the issue of the Edict. Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt saw little alternative to submission to the Catholic demands. But John George, recognizing the basic illegality of those demands, would have no more of submission to illegal laws than he would have rebellion against legal authority. He insisted on the withdrawal of the Edict, though he was willing to limit the withdrawal to a period of fifty years, after which the question of the ecclesiastical reservation could again be opened. Maximilian too compromised; he was willing to see the further implementation of the Edict postponed for forty years. But before any meaningful progress could be made, word came to Frankfurt that Tilly's army had invaded Saxony. Once more: total disregard of the constitution, not to mention the innumerable promises of security made by the League and the Emperor to John George. The Saxon delegation left and went back home.

We have now reached the major turning point in the Thirty Years' War (from the standpoint at least the Lutheran behavior in the War). With the Edict of Restitution, the refusal of the Emperor to discuss it and of the Catholic Electors to press for its withdrawal in the interest of peace, and
with the failure of the Regensburg Kurfürstentag to discuss it or the Frankfurther Compositionstag to resolve the crises which the Edict had provoked, the Lutherans have been forced into a corner and find themselves in an impossible position. It is most regrettable that we do not have available the primary sources for this period, especially from the clergy, the Lutheran universities, and the correspondence between the Elector and these his orthodox Lutheran advisors. Of equal value would be the considerable body of correspondence between the Elector and the Emperor, and that between Saxony and Brandenburg. All of this and more can be found in Lundorp (especially v.4), Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte, and in a book by G. Westen entitled, Negotiation About Church Unity, published by Uppsala, Sweden, in 1932. Unfortunately, none of these works can be obtained locally. We are left to consider what happened from the secondary sources already cited, and then to analyze it in the light of the previously documented principles of the orthodox Lutherans and their Elector.

But before we examine the change from support to active opposition to the Emperor in the Lutheran camp of the Saxon Elector, let us briefly consider the motives of the Swedish invasion and the character of Gustavus Adolphus for what light it may shed on Lutheran behavior in the War. In the 19th century the Swedish King was revered as a sort of cult hero among German Lutherans, and any good Lutheran library will contain works which sing the praises of the Savior of Protestantism, works which often blend fact and fancy, the wish and the reality. Even Charles P. Krauth in his monumental, The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology joins the chorus.

... the name of the martyr-hero Gustavus Adolphus, whose name should be dearer to Protestants, and most of all to Lutherans, who justly claim to be the most Protestant of Protestants, dearer than the name of Washington to Americans, for a part of the
price he paid for the rescue of the religious liberty of Europe was his own blood. But for him, our Protestantism might have been borne down, and swept away from the world in a torrent of blood and fire.\textsuperscript{54}

There can be no question that Gustavus Adolphus was a Lutheran and a Swede to the core, but not always in that order. German Lutheran hymns of praise to Gustavus in the 19th century tend to be addressing the question: Could the Lutheran/Protestant cause in the Empire have survived without his intervention? We, of course, will never know, but the best answer seems to be, maybe not. From the standpoint then of such a question, the Swedish King may well deserve a good share of the adulation reserved for him in the hearts of many Lutherans. But if the question is asked: Did he invade primarily and unselfishly to rescue the Lutheran Church from the Catholic Reaction and its Hapsburg-Wittelsbach sword? then the answer must be, No. The German hymnists to Gustavus Adolphus prefer to forget that with him the House of Vasa was striving for an imperium of its own, one which would turn the Baltic into a Swedish lake, with substantial possessions in Poland, Pomerania, perhaps Brandenburg, and wherever else Vasa's might be able to rest a boot and a boat. From a strictly Lutheran point of view, it would be difficult to defend the intervention on the grounds of the doctrine of the just war; for if the fundamental duty of the paradigm Lutheran ruler is to advance the cause of his subjects without harm to his neighbor and to defend them from foreign attack, then the Swedish intervention was not a just war in the Lutheran sense of the term. For by the time of the intervention, Ferdinand's dreams of making the Baltic his own lake had been dashed on shoals of Strasslund, and the Spanish fleet which eventually set out could not at that time have been considered a serious threat (it was sunk by the Dutch off the coast of Zeeland a week before the Battle of Breitenfeld\textsuperscript{55}).
Why then did Gustavus Adolphus attack Ferdinand? Much of what was said by Gustavus himself and by his ambassador to the German Estates, John Adler Salvius must be dismissed as propaganda aimed at conjuring up support for a project having aims far different from those stated. Gustavus Adolphus, for example, declared to the Swedish Estates assembled at Elbing on May 30, 1629, that to defend Sweden was to defend her faith\(^5\(^6\) while Adler was busy at the same time trying to convince the Estates of Germany that the reason for the invasion was the protection of the German liberties from the Hapsburg tyranny. But in secret sessions the council of state declared that the real goals of the invasion were the closure of German ports and the exclusion of a German navy from the sea; the king was warned not to speak of the war in religious terms, lest he offend the French.\(^5\(^7\) That Gustavus Adolphus chose to view the security of the north German ports in Swedish hands as essential to Sweden's vital interests made the case for a "just war" at least to the satisfaction of his own conscience. But essentially the war was a Swedish one, not a Lutheran one. Indeed, if we look below the surface, we should not expect it to be otherwise; for one of the oft repeated exhortations of the Lutheran writers (notably Luther himself), as we have seen above, was that wars should not be undertaken as crusades under the banner of the Cross and pure doctrine. Given the crisis of the moment, it is difficult to judge the Swedish King too harshly for using the expedient of religion in his propaganda; that was certainly a much easier course to follow than the contorted logic that would have been necessary to justify the invasion for its real reasons. At least Gustavus Adolphus' assorted reasons were not necessarily mutually exclusive. We cannot place him in a class with the perfidious Ferdinand, nor with Wallenstein, the star-gazing cynic. But he also does not belong in a class with the straight-forward, honorable John George.
Nowhere is it more evident that the invasion and subsequent war in Germany was more of a Swedish adventure for Gustavus than it was a Lutheran one than in the way Gustavus behaves whenever peace "threatens." He was not content with the protection of Lutheran and Calvinist liberties through the restoration of the constitution and the withdrawal of the Edict, plus some realistic satisfaction for his troubles. He made it clear to John George in June of 1632 that he would settle for nothing less than Pomerania, supremacy over the Catholic lands he had conquered and the formation of a Corpus Evangelicorum; this latter was to consist of all non-Catholic estates and was to be under the direction of Sweden. While he moderated those demands when dealing with Wallenstein in September, it remained clear that he had an imperialist ambition for himself and Sweden in Germany as a dominating goal, not simply the rescue of his co-religionists mixed with a small dash of self-interest. There is even the report that he told the Duke of Mecklenburg his plans, letting slip a sentence which began, "If I become Emperor...."

But still he was a Lutheran. There can be no doubt that his religious sentiments were genuine and his sympathies with his oppressed brethren in Germany sincere. By the standards of his day he was pious, even virtuous. Lutheran worship services were conducted in his camp regularly, and he took part in them. He did more than most generals to preserve discipline and prevent looting, except in those areas which had stubbornly resisted him. While his devotion to the Lutheran Church and its pure doctrine certainly did not match that of his notable successor, Charles XII, much less approach that of John George, he seems always to have had the best interests of his church at heart. But his Lutheranism was not consistently orthodox; both his subjects and the German Lutherans grumbled about his easy attitude towards the Calvinists and his apparent hope that Lutheran and Calvinists could become one church. Some historians (among them the writers of the Cambridge Modern
History - p. 198) suppose that the agreement with Richelieu, requiring the Swedish King to tolerate the practice of Catholicism in those territories conquered by him, was odious to him. That is highly unlikely. It would have been good politics for him to make it appear distasteful, in order to extract the most mileage from the "concession" to the wily French cardinal. But both in his personal conduct and in his Lutheran training there is only the Lutheran loathing of the use of force in matters of religion. Wedgwood puts it well:

He was nevertheless convinced of the peculiar rightness of his own broad Protestantism, and could not easily conceive how any man could be persuaded by force to change his religion. Yet he was tolerant at least in this respect, that as he scorned those who were converted by compulsion, he scorned himself to use it. He was willing to allow the defeated, of whatever faith, to continue in their errors.60

Back to the Elector of Saxony! At the Kurfürstentag in Regensburg he had joined George William of Brandenburg in addressing a letter (August, 1630) protesting to Gustavus Adolphus on the occasion of his invasion of Pomerania -- the Emperor sent a separate letter to the same effect. At the same time, John George joined with the Brandenburg Elector in submitting yet another plea to the Emperor to withdraw his detestable Edict. But they were answered by an arrogant refusal even to consider it, coupled with another high-handed demand for men and money to support him in his proposed Spanish alliance.61 By this time six bishoprics and their lands, more than 100 convents and countless urban and rural churches in the two Saxon Circles had already been seized and placed into Catholic hands. The thefts had fallen alike on rebel Calvinists and loyal Lutherans, and it was clear that these were but the beginning.62 Committed to the preservation of German territorial integrity and to German liberties, the Elector was caught between the proverbial rock and hard place; both imperial integrity and the liberties of the Estates were of the very essence of the constitution. He could not sit by idly any longer, contenting
himself with protests to Ferdinand, while the latter were destroyed; but he saw no point in himself subverting the constitution by flying to the waiting arms of Gustavus. He therefore did all that he could to rescue the Emperor from his own folly and the consequent ruin of the Empire by maneuvering as best he could within the narrow confines still left to him. It should be noted at the outset that in all of his carefully laid stratagems, he was struggling to maintain both of these fundamental elements of the German constitution, and in so doing, he was consistent and Lutheran. He had, to be sure, lost the innocence so uniquely his when he was dealing with the Emperor and the League at the outbreak of the Bohemian conflict. But he had not become a cynic nor a hypocrite in the intervening years of betrayal by Ferdinand and duplicity by the Catholic Electors, chiefly Maximilian. He doubtless had been too naive when he trusted them so completely in the first place. But he was no fool. While the Emperor had given him more than enough reason to join the Calvinists in revolt, and had doubtless forfeited his claim on the Saxon Elector's oath of obedience by his own breaking of the constitution and the Wahlcapitulation (not to mention promises made specifically to the Elector), John George could only be dragged into rebellion kicking and screaming. Precisely to prevent the necessity of rebellion, he called a meeting of the Protestant princes at Leipzig in February of 1631. If only the Emperor could be made to see that he was not omnipotent, and that he was forcing Lutherans to the arms of the Calvinists in rebellion, perhaps Ferdinand would cease his suicidal course of action in Germany. As John George certainly expected, the Calvinists of Hesse-Cassel were ready to fight again, and said so, as did the Weimar Dukes William and Bernard. It is reported that even (especially?) Pastor Holz called for resistance to the Emperor and his wretched Edict. With more political sagacity than might ever have been expected of him, John George allowed the fiery
speeches to proceed, and then insisted that he would not join a revolution! But nevertheless, to make it crystal clear to Ferdinand that the Emperor's course must change, he joined in the signing of the Manifesto addressed to Ferdinand on March 28. The Manifesto declared that the Edict and the Imperial-League armies were the cause of the destruction in Germany; it bemoaned the disrespect shown to the Estates and the pathetic condition in the country as a result of these two evils; and it called on Ferdinand to join them in remedying these evils. But this was more than the usual complaint from the Saxon Elector: it warned the Emperor that he alone would be responsible for the consequences, if he refused, and declared that the Protestant Estates felt obliged to arm themselves against further violations of the constitution in their territories! The Manifesto was sent with yet another personal appeal from the Saxon Elector. It was signed by Brandenburg and Saxony, together with Anhalt, Baden, Hesse, Brunswick-Lüneburg, Württemberg, Mecklenburg, Nürnberg, Lübeck, Strasbourg, Frankfurt-am-Main, Mühlhausen, Nordhausen, the Protestant Abbess of Quedlinburg, numerous independent nobles, and some of the independent cities of Swabia. The Manifesto is a master stroke of diplomacy: it pleads for German liberties; and by gaining the signatures of the Dukes of Mecklenburg (whose territory and title had been usurped by Wallenstein at the Emperor's appointment of the general as Duke of Mecklenburg) and the ever combative Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel (a Calvinist) it also pleads for the territorial integrity of the Empire. For the Dukes of Mecklenburg and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel had declared an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus; if the Emperor would respond that alliance would be broken. Again, it was a master stroke of diplomacy: it fell short of revolt, but at the same time declared the unwillingness of Lutherans and Calvinists alike to endure any longer the violation of their constitutional privileges.
But the Emperor refused to be reasonable. He still clung to his illusions of omnipotence, and inspired by past glories he was determined to wreck the constitution and Germany on the rocks of the Edict. On May 4, he issued an order forbidding any subject of the Empire to assist in the recruitment of the proposed and already begun Protestant army.

Desperately John George tried to hold the signers of the Manifesto in line. But both Gustavus and Ferdinand were forcing them into rebellion. The Calvinists, who had fresh wind in their sails as a result of all of this talk of united action, were again ready to fight against the Hapsburgs in any event. Brandenburg had the choice of occupation by the Swedish or the Imperialist army. Though John George pleaded with George William not to enter an alliance with the Swedes, the Brandenburg Elector had little choice: the Swedes were already there, and Gustavus (who was married to the Elector's sister) was growing impatient. Likewise Magdeburg was sorely pressed. Its Brandenburg administrator had returned and enthusiastically worked for alliance with Gustavus and a posture of rebellion. But John George urged them, not without success, to resist revolting: the citizens of "traurende Magdeburg" were less than eager in their support of the administrator. The behavior of the Elector at this crucial juncture more than at any other time gives the lie to the charge that he was motivated by political, territorial, or dynastic considerations in his policy, or that his policy had no consistent direction at all. Given the successes of Gustavus on landing, the soon-to-be-heard cries of anguish from Magdeburg, the unity of all opposed to Ferdinand and the divisions of all supporting him, political, dynastic, and territorial considerations would have put him in the forefront of revolt. But he held back. Embassy after embassy come from Gustavus, and each left empty handed — the Emperor all the while being informed of the danger to his House, if he did not relent. Principle, Lutheran principle at that, kept the Elector of Saxony on
a steady course during these most perilous and difficult days from August of 1630 through August of 1631.63

We forego speaking of the tragic sack of Magdeburg,64 beloved city of Lutherans, 24,000 of whose citizens perished in the attack and the fire. While important in itself and certainly important in the public attitudes of the time, it did not alter the fundamental course of John George. Many may declare that no further proof is needed of his inconstancy than this, that he could have prevented the sack by allowing Gustavus to travel the 150 miles to its rescue. Apart from the trite observation that hindsight is always 20/20, we would but note the following: the Elector was trying to prevent the destruction of all Germany; an alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, even for the rescue of beloved Magdeburg could only guarantee that destruction of the Empire; that the Elector could see that when no one else could is a mark of statesmanship and courage of the first order, not a sign of lunacy, callousness, or greedy self-interest.

The incineration of Magdeburg took place in May of 1631. Tilly, who wins the honor of being at least a decent man by trying to mitigate the horror in the city, loses almost as much by his fanatical act of reconsecrating the Lutheran cathedral as a Catholic one. Even this insult heaped on the already considerable injury did not turn the Elector aside from his fundamental policy of keeping the Swedish King waiting and guessing, in the hope that the Emperor would come to his senses. But at length even John George could wait no longer. On September 4, Tilly's army invaded Saxony to attack Leipzig. Was it but a pre-emptive strike? Was it a miscalculation? Was it just the mistake of an army out of control and hungry? It does not matter in the least. The point was that the Elector's duty as an Elector, as a prince, as a Lutheran, was to protect his subjects. He had no choice any longer but
to defend his lands from aggression. Accordingly, with the constitution in shreds anyway, and now with the unavoidable choice between the sacrifice of German liberties and the integrity of the Empire (the latter as much in shreds as the former), John George concluded a hasty alliance with Gustavus Adolphus on September 11, 1631. The terms of the alliance too were master strokes of policy. For while it contained most of the standard provisions (necessary aid and quarter, no separate peace, etc.) it also contained two provisions which were most unusual, but which reflected yet again the Elector's fundamental principles: there was to be joint command of the Saxon army, and control by the Swedes as primus inter pares was to last only "so long as the emergency continued!" That effectively and cleverly negated the provision for no separate peace, and it gave the Elector the option still of seeking the restoration (preservation was no longer at issue) of the constitution.65

Once again we must forego, this time the Battle of Breitenfeld which crushed the army of Tilly and saved Leipzig. We do so while admitting that as great as the victory was, it also proved that our loyal Elector was no soldier -- Gustavus won the battle, after the Saxon troops fled in disorder, with the Elector among the first to flee. We must pass by as well the Battle of Lützen in 1632, at which Gustavus was killed, and most of what happened in between, as not particularly germane to the behavior of the Lutherans and the reasons for it. Armies marched back and forth, and the nation wept and bled and died. Today Mars favored the side which lost yesterday, and tomorrow remained veiled, while the people prayed that tomorrow would not come. Suffice it to say that when John George invaded Bohemia, his army faiored better than it had at Breitenfeld. But more importantly, the Elector made no attempt to conquer the whole of the country. Some may interpret that to mean that he was indecisive. It appears more reasonable to us to assert that he was being consistent: Bohemia belonged to Ferdinand, and as soon as Ferdinand would come
to his senses and restore the constitution, the Elector planned to leave. To be sure, the refugees of 1620-22 poured back into Prahage, and in the process the Calvinists, chief among them the returned Count Thurn, showed that they had not changed: Thurn wanted to stir up the graves again and begin all over his radical Calvinist dreams -- Schlick must have turned over and groaned in his grave. 66

The death of Gustavus Adolphus at the Battle of Lützen in November, 1632, marked another important turning point, if not in the course of the War, then in important attitudes toward it. Exhaustion -- that one word sums up the German state of mind in the winter of 1632-33, whether speaking of Dresden, Munich, Berlin, Prague or Vienna. And the death of the Swedish King gave space for the ventilation of that attitude, which before his death was quite unthinkable. But that exhaustion was not translated into peace. For the worst fears of John George were about to be realized: Germany was to be held captive by non-German interests, and the War begun by Catholic Reaction and Calvinist Radicalism for dominance inside the Reich was about to become the War in which these equally erring sentiments are irrelevant and replaced by competing nationalistic interests, Spanish, Swedish, French and Dutch. The Spanish court was eager to hold the left bank of the Rhine as its German highway to the Netherlands. The French court was just as eager to prevent it and to pursue its general policy goal of European hegemony at Hapsburg expense. The Swedes were determined to have their terms of satisfaction, which hopefully would include Pomerania. And the Dutch sought to keep the German pot boiling, so that with the Hapsburg armies tied down in Germany the Spaniards would not be at liberty to reassert their claims in Holland. Nationalistic (rather than religious) intrigues became the engines of War; the Spanish Infanta married the King of Hungary to tie the Austrian and Spanish branches of the House of Hapsburg more
closely together; the skillful Swedish chancellor, Oxenstierna tempted the Elector of Brandenburg with the prospect of marriage between the young Queen Christina and the Elector's son, while France worked toward a Brandenburg alliance at counter-purposes with the French-Swedish alliance through the subtle hint that Brandenburg could have Pomerania. In 1631 the still rapacious Wallenstein had been recalled by Ferdinand and the League to pull their chestnuts from the fire, and his greed coupled with his desire to get revenge on Maximilian would be in the muddled stew which confronted anyone interested in peace moves at the end of 1632 and the beginning of 1633.

And where were the Lutherans and their redoubtable Elector in this changing scene? With the death of Gustavus Adolphus, John George came to the fore, and claimed leadership of the Protestant forces. Only one major source considers his claim evidence of personal ambition with the goal the claiming for himself the crown of Bohemia.67 In point of fact the Elector moved to gain control of the Protestant alliance in order to pursue his altogether consistent policy. He had entered the alliance in the first place only because he had no choice, given the total destruction of the constitution by Ferdinand and the invasion of Saxony by Tilly. But with the death of the Swedish King, with hints from Wallenstein's ambassador, Sparre, that peace could be achieved through an abandonment of the loathsome Edict, and with the prospect that Ferdinand was a last ready to compromise on that all-important point, John George began to move towards a reconciliation with the Emperor.68

Unfortunately, the able Oxenstierna was able to play on the fears of the Calvinists and on their bellicosity and thus keep the Calvinists as pawns in the Swedish-French alliance against the Hapsburgs. The vehicle which kept the troops fighting in Germany for non-German interests was the Heilbronn Alliance of 1633. The alliance, consisting of estates from four German Circles, included as its leaders the Calvinist Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the Calvinist
brother of Frederick and the new administrator of recaptured Heidelberg, Lewis Philip, and, of course, the Swedish chancellor. Though the alliance treaty created an organ with four German and but three Swedish members, that organ was purely consultative in nature -- direction of the new league was clearly in the hands of the foreign Swedes. In answer to the invitation of the league to join them, John George wrote a letter to its members, pleading with them to avoid foreign alliances which could only wreck what chances for peace there were.69 Not pique over the loss of leadership to Oxenstierna, not territorial ambition, but the consistent desire for the peace of the Empire through the re-assertion of the constitution motivated again the policy of the Elector.

In the pursuit of that policy, the Heilbronner League notwithstanding, the Elector of Saxony entered negotiations with the Catholics which ended in the Peace of Prague in 1635. That these negotiations were carried out "with scant regard for Sweden and none for France"70 by the Saxon Elector should surprise no one; for he had never made any secret of his displeasure at the foreign intrusions into the problems of the Empire, and, again, had entered himself into foreign alliance only because it was the distasteful lesser of two evils. All of the omens for a very favorable peace between Saxony and Ferdinand (with Brandenburg dragged into it) existed until the Battle of Nördlingen in 1634 at which the Swedes were defeated. That the Hapsburgs in alliance with the Spanish army of the Cardinal-Infante and the re-established tie with Maximilian could win without Wallenstein rekindled the loyalty of the weary Ferdinand to Catholic Reaction. (Wallenstein had been betrayed by Ferdinand in the interests of the Spanish and Bavarian ties, and then dismissed; he was murdered in February of 1634.)71 Were it not for the young Ferdinand III, who had little zeal (compared with his father) for the Reaction, the peace negotiations would have failed altogether.
The Peace of Prague was for all practical purposes the last significant involvement of the Lutherans and the Elector of Saxony in the course of the Thirty Years' War. From 1635 events pass out of any effective control or even influence of the Saxon Elector, as the War becomes more and more a European war over graveyard Germany. But this final Lutheran act is a notable one; for to the extent that the Peace of Prague afforded a framework for peace in Germany, or at least a basis upon which negotiations could be conducted, the Lutherans must receive the credit. The forces of Reaction did what they could to hinder the honest efforts of John George.

Gindely has left us with a fairly complete record of the negotiations, and Wedgwood gives us a well-documented summary of the motives at work as those negotiations proceeded. John George, demonstrating how far he had come from the time of innocence in 1619-20, offered conditions for the Peace which he must have known would not be accepted. They were not the conditions of one coming cap in hand, afraid that he might offend or ask too much. The very boldness of his demands, however, assured him of getting more than he could have received from the Emperor, had he left the wily but weary Emperor to his own devices. The Elector's opening terms, for all their brashness, are not at all inconsistent with his total policy and the Lutheran principles which had guided those policies. For himself and his Electorate he made the perfectly reasonable request that payment of the Emperor's debts to him for services rendered in 1620 finally be made. The extent of that payment was negotiable; among the options were the cessation of Lusatia as a hereditary possession to Saxony, or some part of Bohemia or Silesia in combination or with revenues from Silesia. The territory which he sought in Bohemia and its dependencies were predominantly Lutheran. Additionally, he asked consideration for the traditional claims of his House in Magdeburg and Halberstadt, freedom from persecution for Lutherans in Catholic and even in the hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs, the right of return of
refugees to Bohemia without persecution, the restoration of all ecclesiastical territories to their status as of 1612, and that in perpetuity, the restoration of the Palatinate to the successors of Frederick and the Electoral dignity to them after the death of Maximilian, the freedom of Lutheran subjects from the control of Catholic clergy, the admission of non-Catholics in equal numbers with Catholics to the Imperial courts in Spier and in Vienna, and the indemnification of Sweden only at the expense of the Catholic Estates.

There, of course, was no possibility that these demands would be met. Maximilian was furious when he heard them, and the ecclesiastical princes were outraged. But the negotiations continued. The worn out Ferdinand gave the matter into the hands of his advisors for resolution; it was his hope that he could thereby satisfy his reactionary conscience which loathed giving anything back to the heretics, and still achieve peace for which he could take the credit and which he could use still in the interest of reaction at Saxon expense. The lands given back would be on the conscience of his advisors, and the strength of now seasoned Saxon forces could be employed to crush recalcitrant heretics who did not sign the treaty. At the last minute the Emperor still wavered, so painful was it for him to give up the Edict and, one may suppose, its symbolic proof of his own omnipotence. But his son, Ferdinand III, more ready to abandon Catholic lands in the Empire than to put hereditary lands in greater jeopardy, intervened successfully in behalf of the treaty.\(^72\)

The final terms of the treaty were a far cry from the Elector's original proposals and demands. Indeed one may be forgiven the observation, even the criticism, that John George either could have or should have done better than he did. But one must remember the devastation of Germany at the time, the Elector's loathing of the foreign incursions by the Swedes and the Spaniards, his fears for the future of the nation as well as the church should those incursions continue, and the results of the Battle of Nördlingen. With all of
those factors considered, the Elector no doubt imagined that he had done the best possible, the opposition of his wife, his general Arnim (who wanted a general peace instead), and perhaps even some loyal Lutheran subject notwithstanding. The treaty, ratified and exchanged on June 15, 1635, contained the following provisions: the loathsome Edict was withdrawn; the ecclesiastical reservation however was not removed but only modified, i.e., possession of church lands was to revert to the ownership status of 1627, and remain fixed for a period of forty years; during those forty years each disputed case was to be prepared for a peaceful settlement of the dispute; those cases not resolved after forty years were to be submitted to the Imperial courts, which were to be reformed so that they contained an equal number of Catholics and non-Catholics; John George received Magdeburg for his son and Lusatia for Saxony; the Emperor however refused the toleration of the Lutheran faith in the hereditary lands, including Bohemia, with the exception of Silesia; the Elector was obliged to recognize Maximilian in both the possession of his Palatinate conquests and in the Electoral dignity; those who lost lands since 1630 were to be re-instated in their territories, with some exceptions; states were allowed to either sign the Peace of Prague or sue for peace with the Emperor on separate terms, but the Emperor reserved the right to punish rebels as the price of peace; the Elector nevertheless continued to work for a general amnesty, excepting only the children of Frederick. In this last exclusion, under pressure from Hesse-Darmstadt against Hesse-Cassel (Hesse-Darmstadt sought the exclusion of the Landgrave and the incorporation of Hesse-Cassel into Darmstadt), and in the recognition of the Lutheran faith but not the Reformed, one sees the renewed irritation of the Lutherans at the renewed militancy of the Calvinists. At the same time, it must be noted, the Calvinist Elector of Brandenburg was induced to sign the treaty; to be sure he had little choice, and he himself voiced the fear that its terms would be the death of the Reformed religion. Nevertheless, no one could have seriously
believed, not Ferdinand and certainly not John George, that the exclusion of legal recognition would in any way change anything: the Calvinists with princely protection and support had advanced in the Empire for more than 100 years without such recognition. Nor was it the lack of recognition which made them radicals and militarists; as we have already seen, such "isms" were inherent in their systems, recognition or no. From a military point of view the Treaty contained some hopeful provisions for the Elector; while it allowed for only one army in the Empire and forbade alliance independent of the Empire, that single army was to be paid for by the Estates, particularly the Electors, and the Electors were to be its generals. The fact that it was paid for by the Electors and commanded in part by the Electors as well, might serve as an effective check on Imperialist ambitions, at least in Brandenburg and Saxony and as well in those territories over which their sphere of influence extended. Ferdinand III was in over-all command; but he was no Wallenstein, Maximilian, or Ferdinand II in his attitudes. All who signed the treaty were to pledge support for this Imperial army in ridding the country of invading armies, i.e., the Swedes.

The treaty was signed by Saxony, Hesse-Darmstadt, Bavaria, Mainz, Brandenburg, the Lutheran dukes of Mecklenburg (!), and some of the Imperial cities, notably Frankfurth, Ulm, and Lübeck. While such support was extensive, it was insufficient to achieve the general peace on which Arnim insisted; indeed the procedure for ratification almost assured that Arnim would leave Saxon service, since the treaty was arranged only with Saxony, other princes left free to sign it at will.

The Peace of Prague was immediately denounced, as might be expected, by the Dutch, the Swedes, the French and the militant Calvinists who played into the hands of all of the others to the further ruination of their own lands and of the rest of Germany. Perhaps the most interesting denunciation came from the Pope, Urban VIII, whose anti-Hapsburg policies infuriated the Emperor. So
outraged was Ferdinand that he answered the papal denunciation of the treaty by informing the Pope that he had not the least interest in his opinion, and that moreover he had lost all confidence in Urban as the real vicar of Christ. Such talk from this most reactionary disciple would have brought down on his head far different consequences 200 years before. One can but wonder how he thought of himself as Catholic without the Pope. The denunciations of the treaty continue to this day: Wedgwood calls it a betrayal and a preparation for more war rather than the peace intended by the Elector; she but follows Gindely whose opinions of John George and the reasons for them have already been stated. But it was no betrayal when considered from John George's oft expressed reasons for entering the war in the first place, namely the Edict and the invasion of Saxony; the removal of these two provocations left the Elector with no substantive reason for continued rebellion. He had always opposed Calvinist radicalism, he had always opposed Swedish intervention, he had always opposed revolution. While the Peace of Prague was far from perfect, its alternatives, from the point of view of Saxony's consistent policy and the Elector's never hidden motivation, were far worse: continued invasion, devastation and ruin, with no assurance that either Lutheran or Calvinist would end up any better off for it. Indeed, given the level of devastation, the death of Gustavus and the battle of Nördlingen, it was not impossible to imagine that they would all be the worse for continued war. Continued war there was, of course; and while the Peace of Westphalia was more fair from a Calvinist point of view, that fairness was purchased at the price of still further ruin and the secularization of the German mind: whether it was worth the price, whether the same might not have been accomplished anyway and in the same time frame even, are questions worth asking. When the treaty failed of general, not to say universal, acceptance, France preempted any possibility of peace with a declaration of war in May of 1635 — even before the treaty had been formally signed. 74
Life is too short to spend it attempting to detail the fruitless struggles of the years 1635-48, the seemingly endless back and forth of the fortunes of war, the political intrigues and power plays. As already noted, the Lutheran influence and that of the Saxon Elector during these years is minimal. We will content ourselves therefore with but a cursory over-view of the events that ended in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. With the full entry of France into the War purely German interests become secondary and religious considerations all but disappear. The primary German interest is seen in the simply fact that the international struggle is waged on German soil and at German expense. The religious considerations come to the fore only on those occasions when Hapsburg successes on the battle field rekindle flagging Hapsburg zeal for the Reaction, only to have it extinguished again by defeat.

Throughout this final, long, agonizing period of the war, peace efforts with the Peace of Prague as the starting point were never off the front burners of Ferdinand's mind, though again, his price for peace varied with the fortunes of his armies. Thus in the fall of 1636 he sought to consolidate a strong position by calling a Kurfürstentag in Regensburg to elect (at last) his son, Ferdinand III, as King of the Romans. Unlike the last attempt, this one went smoothly, and Ferdinand was elected unanimously. Acting as though there still was a constitution in full force, and an Imperial House that could be expected to honor its provisions, the Electors required of Ferdinand the usual Capitulation, coupled with demands that the army's chief officers be Germans, that the Emperor cease unlimited quartering of troops in Germany, and that Imperial affairs be kept out of the Austrian chancery. With this last success accomplished the weary Ferdinand II was finally ready to make his long overdue exit from the stage of this world. Viewed from his own perspective, his life had not been a failure; viewed from the perspective of almost anyone else it had been
a disaster of the first order. The purge of heretics was not complete, but in the hereditary lands it was close enough; never mind that Bohemia was limp and lifeless, and that the blood had been drained from much of Austria as well. The about to die Emperor could rejoice and give thanks with tears in his eyes as he stopped at Linz on the way back from Regensburg, and there saw all the new Catholics on the way to Mass. They might be plague-racked, pestilence-ridden, poverty-stricken, with half their relatives dead and the other half refugees, and they might only be there because they had no choice — but they once more enjoyed the beneficial protection of the Mother of God. That's what really mattered, at least to Ferdinand. What is more, Hapsburg control over Austria, Bohamia and Hungary was more secure than it had ever been, and with the marriage of his son and successor to the Spanish Infanta, the House was again united. What more could his pre-Probabilist conscience have wanted? After all, it was not for lack of trying that Calvinists still breathed and Lutherans were still abroad in the Empire. In peace he died on February 15, 1637.75

The accession of Ferdinand III, followed by that of the clever Landgravine Amalia to the regency in Hesse-Cassal (also in 1637) and then the succession of Frederick William of Brandenburg in 1640 removed the Lutherans still further from any position of influence. Unlike their predecessors, all of these were consistently politicians first with religious motivations a very distant secondary consideration. Ferdinand III was a pragmatist who looked to the interests of his House and the consolidation of power for his House in the hereditary lands at the expense of Imperial positions in Germany or pan-European schemes in concert with decaying Spain.76 Not that Europe was any better off for the dominance of the politician over the ecclesiastical forces of Calvinist Radicalism and Catholic Reaction: the War dragged on now openly in the interests of greed and raw power politics — earlier those had been motives amidst other motives.
With Germany groaning and crying for the peace which Prague had given, the Kurfürstentag met again in January of 1640 and agreed to the calling of the Reichstag to consider conditions for the establishment of peace on the basis of a general amnesty and a return of power in the Empire to some sort of status ante bellum. Bierther's description of the difficulty encountered by the princes, even some Electors, in attending the Reichstag demonstrates well the state in which Germany found itself; so total was the devastation that the War might make its own conclusion almost impossible:

Later she makes reference to the further difficulty presented by the ruined state of the economy and the unsafe roads, namely the difficulty of even keeping
correspondence going between the princes and their representatives at the Diet: it took weeks for letters to be exchanged, as compared to days before the War.

Since the fortunes of war for the Hapsburgs had reached another of its high-water marks when the diet was called, Ferdinand III had expected to dominate its deliberations. His policy was to force a peace along the lines of the Peace of Prague, ignoring the claims of the European powers knee deep in the struggle, and without the offer of any kind of general amnesty. But the new Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, seized the leadership of the non-Catholic Estates from the Lutheran Elector of Saxony, and by his own militance Frederick William stalemated the pretensions of Ferdinand III. The new Elector was fully the match for any Hapsburg in wily, worldly-wise self interest. He was probably a cynic, with few or no principles, and without them he acted no better and no worse than the Hapsburgs did with too many of them. He held before the Emperor the threat that Brandenburg would make a separate peace with the Swedes; that threat coupled with another change in the fortunes of war, forced Ferdinand to change his tactics. When a truce was signed between Brandenburg and Sweden, the Emperor was left to the device of merely asking the Estates to reconsider their views with reference to the Peace of Prague and the, in November, 1641, to dissolve the Diet.

The Emperor continued to cling to his hope that he could settle matters on terms favorable to himself by the exclusion of the Swedes and the French from the peace process. Given the simple fact that the War was now at least as much an international as a German one (that in spite of the Saxon efforts to prevent it), such a hope became but an obstructionist illusion. Consistent with this policy, Ferdinand supported the call of the Elector of Mainz for a Deputationstag to meet in Frankfurt am Main in 1642. But the Swedes
deftly countered with a more realistic proposal, calling on all (not just the loyal Imperial) Estates of the Empire to assemble to settle their grievances at an international peace conference. The conference was to meet in two separate places simultaneously; the Estates could deal with Sweden at Osnabrück and with France at Münster, and the date was set for March of 1642. What little chance the Emperor's favored Deputationstag had he ruined for himself, when he proposed that the Estates grant him 13 million gulden; realizing that he could only intend to use the money for the continuation of the War which the Estates so desperately needed to end, the Estates accepted the Swedish proposal and concentrated their energies and hopes on the conference in Osnabrück and Münster. The Emperor attempted to nullify the conference by refusing the Estates any right to vote in it. But the refusal of the Landgravine Amalia of Hesse-Kassel to recognize the competence of the Frankfurt Deputationstag, and especially the threat of Maximilian of Bavaria to make a separate peace and withdraw from the Imperial alliance if the Emperor did not cooperate, forced Ferdinand to give way. He finally acceded to the demand of Brandenburg that the international peace conference be granted the status of a Diet, whose acts, once accepted by the Emperor, would have the status of constitutional law for the Empire.80

Continuing hostilities, changing fortunes of war, the rupture of peace between Sweden and Denmark (whose king had offered to mediate between Sweden and the Germans), the apparent eagerness of any and all to fight just a little longer to strengthen their respective positions in negotiations, all contributed to the snail-paced of the conference. To these evidences of man's fallen state were added others just as bad; unlike the behavior of the Estates at the Diet of Regensburg in 1640-41, at which no one pretended that he was other than broke, the Westphalian congress was an exercise in extravagance and pretension. Delegated wrangled and fought over pride of place; they shamed themselves
by their lavish dress and entertainments, by drunkenness and groaning tables, all to impress their opponents with the lie that their people were not yet exhausted and still prepared to carry on with the War — and all this while the German nation was wracked with poverty, plague and famine. It is scant consolation that the foreign representatives apparently led the way in all of this conspicuous waste.\(^{81}\) The actual business of the two branches of the conference did not really begin until late spring of 1645. On June 1st, 26 votes of the Diet were represented at Münster and 40 votes at Osnabrück to hear the proposals of the French and Swedish crowns. The discussion of all of the issues at hand lasted until March, 1646.

Basically, two main divisions of subject matter were considered and resolved:

1. Matters of constitutional concern and importance for the Empire itself. These had to do with the ecclesiastical reservation in general, with specific applications of Imperial power (the Donauwörth case, left over from 1608, the Claves-Jülich succession, the status of the Palatine and of Frederick's heirs), all of which had been the prompting causes of the War in the first place. Given the simple and painful fact that the Empire was divided between Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists, and further divided between those still considered rebels and those loyal to the Emperor, two decisions were of the greatest import, if peace was to be achieved. The first was a general grant of amnesty to all who had been in a state of rebellion at any time since 1618; the amnesty was granted, but with important reservations as to the final disposition of lands and estates within the Empire. The second decision was the granting of legal recognition to the Calvinists, thereby preventing the question of Calvinism from prejudicing any other resolutions of the peace. Compensations were then granted to various princes whose lands had been given
as partial satisfaction to others. Both the compensation of Imperial Estates (especially Brandenburg) and much of the satisfaction for the foreign crowns was accomplished through the secularization of church lands which had long since ceased to be church lands in any case. All ecclesiastical estates were to be left in the possession of those who held them in 1624; the date was much more favorable to Protestants in the north and north west of Germany, but effectively excluded the Protestants from any meaningful future in the south. To settle the strife between the various Catholic religious orders, and to get even with the Jesuits, who had taken advantage of that strife to enrich their order, no order was allowed to take possession of a convent possessed by another, unless that dispossessed order had become extinct in that place; and even then, the Jesuits were not allowed to take possession. The Lutheran and Reformed princes agreed among themselves not to disturb the adherents of the other religion in their territories, no doubt to the considerable relief of the Lutherans in Brandenburg. The right of cuius regio eius religio from the Peace of Augsburg, and before that from 1525, was reaffirmed, though with some limitations. Subjects whose religion in any area had been banned in 1627 were to be left free to practice their faith privately, to raise their children according to their convictions, and to be granted burial according to the rites of their faith; they were left free to emigrate, and some provisions of the peace seem to imply that the prince was free to strongly encourage such emigration. In the territories of the House of Hapsburg, of course, such a thing as freedom of conscience (let alone the free exercise even in private of that conscience) was steadfastly refused. Those who had fled Austria, for example, because of persecution during the War were permitted to return home, but would not be allowed the exercise of their religion nor the recovery of their property. In the Imperial cities the religion of 1624 was to be the established one; in
those Imperial cities where both religions had existed in 1624, both were to be allowed in the future. As the religious settlements represented an adjustment of Imperial pretensions in the House of Hapsburg (and to a much lesser extent among the Lutherans as well) to reality by the inclusion of the Calvinists and the secularization of the already secularized ecclesiastical estates, so too the adjustments to the constitution. As regrettable as it was, no cohesion had existed between the Estates and the Emperor for several generations; since the Reformation and even before it, the legal formula of the Imperial decrees, Unser und des heiligen Reichs Stände, had come to mean less and less. The Hapsburg Reaction of Ferdinand II and the Calvinist Radicalism of Frederick and the Margrave of Hesse-Kassel and others had destroyed what was left of it in the years 1618-1648. The Lutherans had been left alone to defend territorial integrity in the Empire and balance between the power of the Estates and the power of the Emperor, in short, the whole idea of the German constitution. Now, at the congress in Westphalia, with the rebels granted amnesty and a Calvinist (the Elector of Brandenburg) the leader of the non-Catholic Estates, particularism destroyed not only imperial centralism but the entire constitution: the Estates are granted the right to make alliances and treaties with crowns outside of the Empire. Gone was all balance and all possibility of unity between Reich and Stände, and gone as well was the theoretical integrity of the territory of the Empire. John George, true to his loyalty to the constitution protested but in vain; again, the Peace of Prague was the last act for the Lutherans. The Peace of Westphalia for all its achievements buried moderation and legalized the Reaction in the Hapsburg hereditary lands and the Calvinist Radicalism in the rest of Germany. To be sure, the right to form alliances outside of the Empire was limited to such unions as were not directed against the Landesfrieden, the Emperor or the Empire; that reservation was, however, little
more than a nod in the direction of a past unity now gone. Likewise the position of the Electors as first princes of the Empire and protectors of the constitution was revised out of existence, and all of the Estates were given the right of voting on all Imperial business. With the position of the Electors and their power dispersed, their position became empty and the power of the Estates so defused became impotence. Even the Diet to which this defuse power came was crippled in its receipt: henceforth no decision of the Reichstag would be binding on those who opposed it -- once again, Radicalism enshrined to the ruin of the State. To be sure, the various commissions of the Diet, together with the Reichskammergericht, were to be reformed so as to grant a greater degree of equality between Catholics and non-Catholics; but with the Empire reduced to a confederation of independent States, what did it really matter?

2. The second subject of consideration related to the satisfaction of the French and the Swedish crowns. In this the Emperor was pragmatic and so, of course, sacrificed German interest to those of security in the absolute possession of the hereditary lands. He saw that his position in the Empire was being reduced to almost nothing and so he turned sharply eastward; he gave up part of Pomerania to the Swedes, thus giving the Swedes seats in the Diet, and he gave France Upper and Lower Alsace with the imperial cities and bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun. Brandenburg was compensated with secularized bishoprics, as already mentioned. While the Emperor's rights in Alsace had amounted to little, so that in giving them up he lost little, nevertheless the position of the French on the Rhine was now secure and assured weakness for Germany. The only direct loss of territory to Ferdinand was Breisach's fortress; his gain was the consolidation of his own lands and the exclusion of non-Catholics from them, at a cost of German territory ceded to Sweden and France.82
The Peace of Westphalia was finally signed in October, 1648, and ratified in February, 1649, when France and Sweden undertook to guarantee its provisions. Calvinist Radicalism and Catholic Reaction left Germany exhausted and in ruins. The course of Lutheran moderation had failed to prevent the War, failed to keep it from becoming international at German expense, failed to preserve the constitution -- but certainly not for lack of effort. The Catholic Reaction got its way in the Hapsburg hereditary lands and in Bavaria; the Calvinist Reaction got its way as well (after it had ceased to matter very much) in much of the rest of Germany. But at what cost! By 1648 peace was better than war, and judged by that standard, the Peace of Westphalia was a good peace. The Pope, Urban VIII, had done all he could to prevent treaties with heretics at the time of the Peace of Prague; now Pope Innocent X, on November 20, 1648, issued the Bull, Zelo domus Dei in which he declared the Peace of Westphalia:

null and void, accursed and without any influence or result for the past, the present, or the future.

In keeping with the practice already yellow with age, he reminded one and all that promises and oaths made to and with heretics were not binding. But Germany was too tired to listen. As irrelevant as "what if" questions are in history, one cannot help but put at least a few of them:

What if the world had listened to Luther's clear distinction of the roles God gave to Church and State?

What is the Hapsburg wall which separated honor from reality and instead wed honor to a reactionary sword had been beaten down by the irenic principles of the Lutheran moderates?

What if the Calvinist Radicals could have seen, as the Lutheran Elector did, that their radicalism would end in the destruction of their nation?
What is historians of the present would stop judging the moderate principles of Luther and his successors by Calvinist and Catholic standards, view them objectively and judge them by the candle of orthodoxy?
ENDNOTES
The Formative Period in Luther and the early Lutheran Church

Part I The Historiographical Problem


8. Benecke, p. 7


Part II The Contrast Between the Orthodox Lutheran and the Calvinist/Reformed Attitudes toward the State

1. E. G. Schwiebert, *Luther And His Times* (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing House, 1950), pp. 82-85


9. Ibid., pp. 66-7


11. Ibid., p. 95

12. Ibid., p. 101

13. Ibid., pp. 110-112

14. Ibid., pp. 114-115

15. Ibid., pp. 124-125

16. Ibid., pp. 120-121


18. Ibid., pp. 57-8


21. Ibid., pp. 28-9

22. Ibid., pp. 40-1

23. Ibid., "Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants," tran. Charles M. Jacobs, pp. 49-51

24. Ibid., pp. 52-3


26. Ibid., p. 81

27. Ibid., pp. 67-71

28. Ibid., pp. 71-2
(Endnotes cont., p. 3)

29. Ibid., pp. 82-4 passim
30. Ibid., "On War Against the Turks," tran. Charles M. Jacobs, pp. 167-8
31. Ibid., pp. 185-6
32. Ibid., p. 187
33. Ibid., p. 190
34. Ibid., p. 193


37. Ibid., p. 38
38. Ibid., p. 81

39. Ibid., pp. 82-3


45. Philip Melancthon, "Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope, The Book of Concord, p. 239

46. Grimm, p. 203

47. Grimm, pp. 223-6; cf. also Leopold von Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation (Leipzig, Dunker und Humblot, 1873) vol. 5, pp. 313-321

48. Grimm, p. 230

49. Ibid., p. 488
(Endnotes cont., p. 4)

50. Ibid., p. 212


52. Ibid., p. 117

53. Ibid., pp. 125-136 passim

   (This volume contains a number of primary sources, letters and papers used by the Bishop of Salisbury in the compilation of his history, among them the cited translation of the purposes of the Smalkaldic League of princes.)

55. For a complete consideration of Henry's machinations and the steadfast resistance of the Elector of Saxony, cf.:
   Christine J. Black, C. E. Chalbis, ed., Henry VIII to his Ambassadors at the Diet of Natisbon; note especially the footnotes directing attention to:
   Great Britain, Public Record Office, Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII, vols. 16-17

   Of great value would be:
   Johannes Kühn, ed., Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Karl V, herausgegeben durch die historische Kommission bei der Bairischen Akademie der Wissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1935). Unfortunately, only the volumes dealing with the work of the Diet from 1527 to 1529 are available locally (vols. 71 and 72 at Newberry).

56. Benecke, p. 230

57. Grimm, pp. 495-6

58. Ibid., p. 206

59. Ibid., pp. 208-9

60. Ibid., pp. 339-365, 445-6, 571-592; cf. also
   Valentin, pp. 173-5

61. Wedgwood, p. 22

62. Ibid., pp. 42-3

63. Grimm, p. 490; cf. also
   Hans-Werner Genisch, We Condemn, tran. Herbert J. A. Bouman (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing House, 1967), pp. 198-9

64. Grimm, pp. 491-2

2. Ibid., pp. 90–92


4. Ibid., pp. 464–5

5. Ibid., pp. 103–7

6. Grimm, pp. 497–9

7. Lundorp, 1:800–10, passim

8. Parker, p. 91

9. Grimm, pp. 499–500

10. Ibid., pp. 501–3

11. While continuing reference will be made to constitutional issues in the 17th century, space does not permit us here to give the development of the Imperial constitution ane and post 1356 the attention it deserves. Relatively little has been written on the subject in English, and German sources are in scant supply. The subject is treated well and at some length in the first volume of the two volume wor, *The Development of the German Public Mind*, by Frederick Hertz. The problem of kingship and its role in German tribal societies and estates before and after the Golden Bull is also treated well, though incidentally, in the above cited, *The German People — Their History and Civilization from the Holy Roman Empire to the Third Reich*, by Veit Valentin. Indispensable for a study of the workings of the distinctly Imperial organs of the Hapsburgs is, *The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century*, by H. F. Schwarz and John I Coddington; the work includes a considerable appendix of biographical material on the leading figures in the Council; unfortunately the authors do not always distinguish between Lutherans and Calvinists in the biographies; of particular interest is the biography of Heinrich Julius von Braunschweig — the role of this fascinating man in the council as described by this work, coupled with a study of his influence in Lutheran orthodoxy make Heinrich Julius a man unique in his day and worthy of far more attention than he has received. An important work, and one to which we shall make direct reference below, is Katherin Bierther's, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641*; the work contains a good deal of background
material for the constitutional struggles of the 1640 Diet. Not used in the preparation of this work, but needing investigation are the volumes of "Quellen und Studien zur Verfassungsgeschichte des Deutschen Reiches im Mittelalter und Neuzeit," particularly, Karl Zeumer's article in vol. 2 (1908) on the Golden Bull.


13. Ibid., p. 26

14. Parker, p. 83


16. Parker, p. 87

17. Valentin, p. 191

18. Gindely, 2:250


20. Schwartz, p. 24

21. Parker, pp. 84-5


23. Parker, pp. 84-5; cf. also Wedgwood, pp. 50-3, 70-5 Grimm, p. 509

24. Steinberg, p. 26

25. Wedgwood, pp. 59-61


27. Ibid., pp. 112-126


29. Benecke, p. 10

30. Lundorp, 1:183-4
Endnotes cont., p. 7)

31. Ward, 4:10

32. Wedgwood, p. 90
Part II The Crucible (1618-1648)

1. Wedgwood, p. 90
2. Ibid., p. 106
3. Ibid., p. 96
4. Ibid.
5. Gindely 1:354
6. Ibid., 1:136
7. Wedgwood, p. 107
8. Gindely, 1:199-200
9. Lundorp, 2:84-7
10. The Lundorp manuscript contains a problem here (2:87-90). The first section of the manuscript is ascribed to Polycarp Leyser, who, in the last years of his life was professor of theology at the University of Wittenberg and also Court chaplain — the predecessor of Dr. Höf. Leyser remains in the first rank of the defenders of Lutheran orthodoxy during the troubled times when the Calvinists were trying to infiltrate and destroy the Lutheran Church from within by their artificial and deceitful subscription to the Augsburg Confession. Accordingly this manuscript attributed to Leyser, with its obvious anti-Calvinist position, corresponds well with his known position. The problem is that Lundorp gives it a date of 1620; but Leyser died in 1610. It could be, of course, that Leyser wrote the document earlier, and that his admiring successor, Dr. Höf, brought it out anew and presented it once again to the Elector at the later date, to remind the Elector of his former pastor’s position. But the conclusion and subscription to the manuscript militates against such a view; the closing subscription reads: "Geschieden zu Dresden an Tage dess Heil. Märttyers Polycarpi/An. 1620." In Pastor Höf's Appendix to the Leyser manuscript, he makes reference to the theological activities of Leyser's son and a treatise of the younger Leyser in defense of his father, dated 1616. But that treatise appears to be in answer to the attacks of the Calvinists on the work here being cited, with the 1620 date. We are left with the alternatives: either this 1620 manuscript is a part of the defense written by the son — whose full name I cannot determine, or Lundorp is mistaken in the date given this manuscript; perhaps it is only a typographical error; given the fame of Polycarp Leyser in his day, it seems unlikely that Lundorp did not know that Leyser died in 1610. The mystery remains.

This is perhaps as good a place as any to remark briefly on all of the direct citations from Lundorp: we have attempted to present the quotations exactly as they appear in the Lundorp manuscripts. Those familiar with 17th century German will not be surprised by the punctuation
or the appearance of one word spelled in several different ways in the same work (e.g., und, unnd, um). There nevertheless may be some errors in the citations, due to the quality of the manuscript in the Lundorp edition being used for this work; in addition to the problem of words which just run together, the type in some instances is so faded that some letters are very difficult or virtually impossible to decipher. While a magnifying glass often helped, it did not settle every question.

11. Lundorp, 2:87
12. Ibid., 2:88
13. Ibid., 2:89
14. Ibid., 2:91
15. Ibid., 2:92
16. Ibid., 2:95
17. Ibid., 2:98
18. Ibid., 2:99
19. Ibid., 2:100
20. Ibid., 2:102
21. Ibid., 1:932
22. Ibid., 1:932-9
23. Ibid., 1:944
24. Ibid., 1:947
25. Ibid., 1:950
26. Ibid., 1:951
27. Ibid., 1:952
28. Ibid., 1:953
29. Ibid., 1:956
30. Ibid., 1:926
31. Ibid., 1:927
32. Ibid., 1:928
33. Ibid., 1:930
34. Ibid., 1:931
35. Gindely, 1:200-4; cf. also, Wedgwood, 107-8, 116-7; we cannot agree with Wedgwood's concluding remarks on John George's position in the negotiations, namely, "...unfortunately he also asked for the cession of Lusatia to Saxony. This selfish stipulation weakened a position otherwise unassailable." Since when does the soldier fight without payment, and the prince enter battle solely for another's glory, enrichment, and power. The State always pays the soldier (or is supposed to pay him) under its flag, and the Emperor was expected to pay the prince who paid the soldier.

36. Gindely, 1:265-9

37. Wedgwood, p. 114

38. Ibid., p. 143


40. Lundorp, 2:630-1

41. Ibid., 2:631-3

42. Ibid., 2:633-5

43. Ibid., 2:649-52

44. Ibid., 2:652-3

45. Wedgwood, pp. 158-65; Gindely, 1:343-55; Parker, p. 181

46. Ward, p. 69

47. Ibid., pp. 82-96

48. Ibid., pp. 76-7; Wedgwood, p. 213

49. Ward, pp. 102, 108; Wedgwood, pp. 217-22

50. Wedgwood, pp. 224-32; on pages 227-8, Wedgwood has some interesting observations on the character of the Emperor:

The Emperor was fundamentally conventional. He prided himself that he had never broken his word, and could satisfy all his unconstitutional acts on specious ground. Finding it very easy to believe what he wanted to believe, he derived himself into thinking that he had kept the letter of every oath he had every sworn unless circumstances had made it impossible.

While we agree with the analysis, we cannot but again note the capacity of man in general and this man in particular for self-delusion, and at the same time observe that Ferdinand's Jesuit inspired reactionary world view aided and abetted that process by divorcing the concepts of truth and honor from any objective reality, and making them totally dependent on the goal of exterminating heresy and heretics by the use of raw force and state power. Such world shattering goals and the consequent separation of truth and reality, we would maintain, were impossible for a Lutheran and all but inconceivable to John George as a Lutheran.
(Endnotes contr., p. 11)

51. Benecke, p. 14

52. Gindely 1:437-8

53. All of the material for the Edict of Restitution, the Regensburg Kurfürstentag, and the Frankfurt Compositonstag has been synthesized from the following sources:  
   Gindely, 1:434-52, 2:4-5, 9-15, 27-8;  
   Ward, pp. 109-17, 676-83;  
   Wedgwood, pp. 239-59;  
   Steinberg, pp. 50-3

54. Charles P. Krauth, The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology  
   (Minneapolis, Minnesota, Augsburg Publishing House, 1871), p. 156

55. Wedgwood, p. 302

56. Ward, p. 190

57. Steinberg, p.54

58. Ward, pp. 215-6

59. Wedgwood, p. 311

60. Ibid., pp. 272-3

61. Ward, p. 197

62. Parker, p. 216

63. Wedgwood, pp. 278-85; Wedgwood has an excellent analysis of the behavior of John George at this point in time, relative to the constitution on pp. 280-1. Cf. also  
   Ward, p. 200; Parker, pp. 220-3

64. Steinberg, pp. 56-7; Wedgwood, pp. 286-91; Parker, p. 221; Ward, pp. 201-3

65. Parker, p. 223; Wedgwood, pp. 294-5

66. Ward, p. 209

67. Ibid., p. 224

68. Gindely, 2:204; Ward, p. 225; Wedgwood, pp. 335-9; Parker, p. 229

69. Steinberg, p. 63; Ward, pp. 225-6; Wedgwood, pp. 341-2, 368

70. Steinberg, p. 67

(Endnotes cont., p. 12)

72. Gindely, 2:205-14; Wedgwood, pp. 386-8
73. Wedgwood, p. 388
74. Wedgwood, pp. 388-91; Steinberg, pp. 67-8; Benecke, p. 16; Bierther, p. 16; Ward, p. 395; Parker, pp. 241-4
75. Wedgwood, pp. 407-11; Ward, pp. 372-3; Gindely, 2:248
76. Steinberg, pp. 76-7
77. Ward, pp. 383-4
78. Bierther, pp. 38-9
79. Wedgwood, pp. 437-41
80. Ibid., pp. 450-1, 463-4
81. Ward, pp. 402-3
82. For a detailed examination of the Peace of Westphalia and the struggles both in the congress and out of it that led to the Peace, see: Ward, pp. 399-417; Wedgwood, pp. 479-501; Steinberg, pp. 80-3
83. Ward, p. 688
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources


Contains original sources either in full or in excerpt form; The sources selected come from a number of different fields, e.g., political (The Peace of Augsburg, Prague and Westphalia), propaganda (tract on the Sack of Magdeburg), and even the novel (Simplicius Simplicissimus).


The life of a rustic turned soldier-adventurer during the Thirty Years' War. The author of the novel was a Lutheran who became a Catholic during the War years. The work well depicts both the depravity and the cynicism which overwhelmed Germany during these tragic years. Steinberg points to this novel as evidence that the state of affairs in Germany was not really all that bad, given the ability of Simplicius to have a fairly good time during his wanderings. But he ignores the obvious fact that the good times of Simplicius were at the expense of other people in their misery, and that the War itself prevented Simplicius from having anything approaching an orderly or a more normal life.


The text of the Edict of Worms.


Apart from its intrinsic value for its documents, the work is fascinating as a study of German spelling in all of its inconsistencies during the 17th century. The document's included were selected by an editor with a clearly pro-Hapsburg and Catholic bias -- it contains few if any pro-Calvinist documents. Among the documents included are the Imperial election capitulations, extensive correspondence between the Electors, princes and the Emperor, and theologians of the time, as well as published theological and propaganda works. Most of the cited documents have a brief introduction by the editor, which usually includes a summary of the document's contents. (NOTE: Londorp's name is sometimes spelled, "Lundorp").
(Selected Bibliography, p. 2)


Secondary Sources


This work is particularly useful as a study in the historical apologetics and polemics of the Lutheran Confessions as they relate to the Lutheran struggles against the Calvinists in the 16th century.


Written with a Bohemian-Reformed bias; the work is thorough and contains innumerable quotations from the primary sources; unfortunately the location of those sources used by Gindely is never given.


This work contains a wealth of material not only on the Council itself but also on its membership. Generally, the biographical material discusses the religious view of the individual members, but often fails to distinguish between Lutheran and Reformed.


This book is doubtless the definitive work for the historical and social setting in which the Reformation of Saxony took place.


A highly controversial work in which the author (unconvincingly) asserts that the War was not as devastating to Germany as is generally believed. Geoffrey Parker rightly criticizes it as, "often tendentious in interpretation and sometimes unreliable in detail" (p. 356). It is nevertheless useful for its summation of events and sometimes interesting analysis of character.


This work is useful for its consideration of the effects of the War on Germany and the rest of Europe.


The work of this eminent historian is a good example of the failure of historians generally to examine the Lutheran role as distinct from that of the Reformed and to see in Lutheran principles anything essentially different from the principles of the Calvinists; he contented himself throughout with interpreting Lutheran behavior devoid of any consideration of Lutheran ethics, and sees the difference as a purely political or economic one.


This work by a German Protestant refugee of the Third Reich is a masterpiece at its analysis of the German character; at its conclusion the author raises some very worthwhile questions about the
reason for the translation of some types of German authors and the lack of translation into English of so many others; he finds answers to his questions in the varying fortunes of German policy relative to British and then British-American foreign policy.


A topical consideration of Europe during this period. In addition to its thorough consideration of the personalities and phases of the War, the work contains a valuable study of papal policy during this time.


Though severely criticized by Steinberg as "vitiated by taking a narrow, sentimental German view" (p. 123), this is undoubtedly the best of the 20th century works examined for this paper. It is thorough and very well documented. The author makes a concentrated effort to understand sympathetically the leading protagonists in the War. At times she comes very close to understanding John George, the Saxon Elector, with her appreciation of his constitutional concerns; but she fails to see the distinctively Lutheran nature of those concerns and the principles which motivated them and, accordingly, falters in her analysis of his character and behavior.