Before the end of 1610, the Catholic League had a standing army of more than 25,000, the patronage and protection of Philip III, subsidies from Philip, the active support of the three ecclesiastical Electors and twenty other territorial rulers. Maximilian was an ardent champion of the Catholic Reaction, at least in the lands under his own control. He was utterly ruthless in rooting out Lutherans and Calvinists alike, first in Bavaria itself, then (as noted above) in Donauwörth, and later (during the War) in those parts of Austria assigned to him by Ferdinand until Ferdinand's war debts to Bavaria could be paid. His court was home and haven to Jesuits, and his training had been Jesuit led and inspired. The religious policies of their disciple more than repaid the apostles of the Reaction. Maximilian was as ruthless in politics as he was in religion. (Once again, the shameless motto of, "The end justifies the means," haunts a disciple of the Jesuits.) To the Bavarian duke whatever was good for the Bavarian duke was good, and whatever did not serve his own narrow interests was bad. In the early years of the War, it served his purposes to support the Emperor (to whom he was related by marriage) and thus to champion centralization. Before the War, he had treated his Wittelsbach cousins in the Palatinate with unaccustomed friendship; but as soon as the prospect of their fall presented itself, he bargained secretly with his relatives in Vienna to accomplish a trade of his support for the Electoral dignity and lands of the unhappy Frederick. Once he had all he wanted from the Emperor, he just as suddenly became a champion of the German liberties, and demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein. At the same time that he had become a reconverted champion of the German liberties, he was making alliances with the French. In his own lands, when he was not rooting out heresy and joining in the interrogation of suspected witches on the rack, he built schools and hospitals and fostered the arts. But that apparent good was more than counter-balanced by his ceaseless and Puritan rigor in making sure that the peasants were virtuous
and that his own servants were paid as little as possible, perhaps to save them from the vices of affluence. When, during the final phase of the War, Maximilian's lands too were devastated as the lands of so many others had been with his earnest support, many might be forgiven a faint smile of satisfaction that he received what he had so generously given; by that time, of course, there were few left who could smile or have anything to smile about. In sum, Maximilian was a gifted and able prince, a grasping, blood thirsty bigot; had he been at all high minded, he could have saved Germany from the blood bath of the War, and he alone; for Ferdinand could not have taken the Bohemian rebellion into Germany without Maximilian. Among Lutheran and Calvinists alike in Austria, Bohemia, Bavaria, the Palatine and the north German duchies, his name lives in infamy the like of which is shared by few others.

Frederick V

In the Elector Palatine and the Winter King of Bohemia we have the Protestant Calvinist counter-part to Maximilian I of Bavaria. Like his Bavarian cousin, Frederick had great ambitions and as a Calvinist was not averse to shedding other people's blood in order to achieve them. But there the comparison ends. Frederick had neither the wealth nor the political sagacity to match Maximilian. Unlike Maximilian, who never ceased in his activity, Frederick appears to have been a bit lazy. He inherited the leading role in the Protestant Union from his father, Elector Frederick IV when the latter died in September of 1610. The Union had been formed in 1608 as a Protestant reaction to the tragic events in Donauwörth. From the beginning, it was chiefly a Calvinist organ, though a few of the Lutheran cities in the south of Germany had also joined it in fear of attack by Maximilian. The Union often tried to win the support of Lutheran Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt, but it never succeeded. An examination of its activities when compared with the Lutheran principles with regard to rebellion make it clear very quickly that the Union was incompatable
with Lutheran orthodoxy. Frederick V simply proceeded with the un-Lutheran policies of his father in the Union, acting through the arch-Calvinist Christian von Anhalt. Christian von Anhalt and his Wittelsbach patrons envisioned a grand Protestant anti-Hapsburg alliance with the Dutch and the English. The Dutch supported the Union with subsidies -- with 1621 drawing closer, they had reasons of their own for wanting friends in the Empire. The English gave their support in the person of the only surviving daughter of James I, Princess Elizabeth. The Elector Palatine held lands of strategic importance to the anti-Hapsburg alliance, a fifty mile stretch of territory which blocked the way of Spanish troops on the way to the Netherlands. But those lands and the alliance of Calvinists within Germany were not enough to bring about the downfall of the Hapsburgs: from London through the Netherlands and down to Heidelberg one dream lived in the hearts of the Calvinists: the toppling of the Hapsburgs in Bohemia. For so long as a Hapsburg was king of Bohemia the Electoral College would remain Catholic for the purposes of the Imperial Election. But if the Calvinists of Bohemia would elect a Calvinist -- or even, if it had to be, a Lutheran king -- Hapsburg power and Catholic power in the Electoral College would be broken. From the age of 14, Frederick was moulded by his father, Christian von Anhalt, and the court chaplain for this role of Protestant champion by way of marriage and Bohemia. With the solid Protestant marriage accomplished in 1613, there but remained the death of the childless Matthias for the plats to be given life. That Ferdinand had already been accepted as king-designate and was in fact accepted and elected as king was but a temporary inconvenience: revolt, that dreaded word to the Lutherans, revolt would make everything right from a Calvinist point of view. In Bohemia the schemes of Christian von Anhalt in behalf of his master were not without support. To be sure, the Lutherans had been panicked by the revolutionary radicalism of the Calvinist minority in Bohemia; that radicalism
and their inherent loathing of violence and revolt were without doubt factors in their support of the Hapsburgs. The Lutheran leader, the soon to be tragic figure, Count Schlick, was no match for the Calvinist plotters both outside and inside of Bohemia. The task of chief plotter within Bohemia fell to the mercurial, ambitious, hot-headed Count Thurn, who had interests in the Empire as well as smaller ones in Bohemia. As may readily be seen from the above, Frederick himself was a warm body and not much more in the Calvinist scenario. But he was more than willing to be used by his co-religionist, most importantly Christian von Anhalt, and then in his turn, Count Thurn; and therefore, Frederick V must bear the responsibility of the disasters which followed him as he followed them. He allowed himself to be put at the head of a revolt; that he had neither an understanding of its end at the beginning, nor the requisite political and military and intellectual gifts to pull it off will not excuse him. From Frederick's own point of view, what he was doing was the will of God, and God would see to its success; to put it another way, his actions and intentions were consistent with a Calvinist view of the world and of the state within the Empire; those who acted in his name shared that view and were motivated by it.23

John George I

We have left consideration of John George I, Elector of Saxony from 1611-1656, to the last of our characterizations in order to focus the more sharply on the crucial question of this entire study. If we ask the question: Did the Elector John George act before and during the Thirty Years' War in a manner consistent with the above described principles of Lutheran orthodoxy? the answer is much clearer when set in the context of the behavior and the character of the above mentioned Ferdinand II, Maximilian I, and Frederick V (together with his co-religionists). Did the first two act consistently with the principles of the Catholic Reaction? Most certainly they did at least
until 1635. Did Frederick and his advisors act in a manner which faithfully reflected the attitudes of Zwingli and Calvin in their day? Who would argue that they most certainly did. But, as has already been intimated, when the Lutherans and their leaders are considered, the question is invariably mis-framed; the question is rarely: Did they act consistently in accord with Lutheran principles? It almost always is: Why were they such poor or cowardly or inconsistent or inconstant Protestants? An altogether unfair question, since they never claimed to be political or religious kinsmen of the Calvinists, and had very good reason for refusing to be thus identified. To put it simply, no one should have expected them as Lutheran to behave much differently than they did; it is unfair to judge them by a Calvinist standard.

Precisely because of the common practice of judging John George by an unfair standard, the attacks on him have likewise been unfair, not to say harsh. He is called "an enigma," indecisive, confused, unfaithful. But when considered according to the traditional parameters and standards of Saxon politics, there is very little that is confused or enigmatic in John George's behavior. Since the time of the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, Saxon policies have been dominated by two complementary principles: 1) a Lutheran loathing of revolutionary radicalism, as embodied in an assortment of Calvinist-lead political schemes and alliances which could only end in military confrontation, civil war; this principle kept Saxon policies loyal to the integrity of the Empire; that integrity from a Saxon point of view could best be maintained with Hapsburgs on the imperial throne; a Calvinist Emperor could only mean radicalism which would push the Catholics revolt and involve the Empire in foreign wars on its western frontiers for the advancement of the Calvinist theocracy, particularly in France and Holland. To be sure, the Hapsburgs of Vienna had equal and opposite interest in fighting in France and Holland by way of the Spanish connection and the traditional rivalry between the Hapsburgs and the French. But the
Hapsburg ambition could be checkmated effectively in the Kurfürstenrat and in the Reichstag by the simple expedient of refusing to allow foreign troops in Germany and refusing to vote the taxes necessary for pursuing wars against the French. 2) The second engine which had driven Saxon policies was the defense of the German liberties against absolutist pretentions of strong emperors. Since the time of the Peace of Augsburg, support of the Hapsburg candidates for the Imperial crown had appeared the safest way to pursue this policy goal as well as that of the integrity of the Empire. To support someone like Frederick IV or V for the Imperial crown, with their strong standing armies inside of the Empire rather than a weak Hapsburg whose armies were in Austria, Hungary and Bohemia did not make much sense from the standpoint of the safety of the liberties of the individual German estates. To support Maximilian I, also rich and powerful inside of Germany, instead of Ferdinand who had troubles aplenty to occupy him in Hungary, Austria and -- sadly -- Bohemia, also did not make much sense. (The Calvinists had toyed with the idea of supporting Maximilian as an alternative to Ferdinand, but the plan floundered for lack of enthusiastic and decisive support from Maximilian.)

In short, an examination of the behavior of John George in the light of these two principles will show that his behavior in the main was consistent, even predictable, and not at all confused or enigmatic. That is not to say that John George was a political genius or even a perfect Lutheran. He had his faults. Too many historians, however, failing to perceive his principles at work, content themselves with pointing out his faults and dismissing him on their account. Thus Steinberg, who rarely shows much sympathy for anyone in the German tragedy, is particularly scathing in his dismissal of John George:

If the policies of Saxony as well as Brandenburg lacked any purposeful drive during the greater part of the first half of the seventeenth century, the fault lay mainly in the incompetence and lassitude of their rulers. John George
I of Saxony (1611-56) and George William of Brandenburg (1619-40) vied with each other in sluggishness and prevari-
cation. Both spent the greater part of their lives besotted
behind their beer-mugs; both had a special gift of alienating
honest advisers, and both tamely submitted to the evil counsels
of men who were open to shameless bribery by foreign potentates.24

Even Wedgewood admits, and we cannot deny it:

... John George had preserved the good old German cus-
tom of carousing in a manner that shocked men under
French or Spanish influence, Frederick of the Palatin-
ate and Ferdinand of Styria. John George, who scorned
foreign delicacies, had been known to sit at table
gorging homely foods and swilling native beer for seven
hours on end, his sole approach at conversation to box
his dwarf's ears, or pour the dregs of a tankard over
a servant's head as a signal for more. He was not a
confirmed drunkard; his brain when he was sober was
perfectly clear, and he drank through habit and good
fellowship rather than weakness. But he drank too much
and too often. Later on it became the fashion to say
whenever he made an inept political decision that he
had been far gone at the time, and the dispatches of
one ambassador at least are punctuated with such re-
marks as, "He began to be somewhat heated with wine,"
and "He seemed to me to be very drunk." It made dip-
lopacy difficult.

But Wedgewood, though holding to the view that John George was enig-
matic in his policies, keeping everyone in the dark -- probably himself
included -- as to the direction he would take and the side he would favor,
goes on to point out his virtues as well as she had pointed up his faults.
Indeed, in her very defense of his virtues and the manner in which he
practiced them she makes a good case for his consistency and predictability.
She points out that he was good Lutheran family man, who conscientiously
strode to carry out his principles. He faithfully attended services with his
family at his court chapel three times a week and regularly received the
Sacrament as a devout Lutheran. And then, appearing to contradict her view
that John George was enigmatic and confused, she says:
He wanted above all peace, commercial prosperity, and the integrity of Germany; unlike Frederick or Ferdinand he had no mission and did not wish to risk present comfort for doubtful future good. Seeing that the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was in danger of collapsing, he knew no remedy save that of shoring it up again. Between the two parties that were wrenching the structure apart, between German liberties and Hapsburg absolutism, he stood for the solidarity of ancient things. First and last he was a constitutionalist.

Does that not sound like a policy? She goes on:

Of the three leaders he was probably the most intelligent, but he had neither Ferdinand's self-confidence nor Frederick's confidence in others; he was one of those who, seeing both sides to every question, have not the courage to choose. When he did act his motives were wise, honest and constructive, but always acted too late.

But didn't he choose? There was never any doubt about his sympathies during the Bohemian revolt nor for that matter about his sympathies during the rest of the War, as we shall see. The only doubt was: Could Ferdinand finally push the Catholic policy of Reaction so far that even John George would take to the field against him? When that question was finally answered, no one, including Gustavus Adolphus and his advisors, ever doubted that at the first opportunity John George would return to the side of the Emperor. That was clear to one and all, precisely because the policy of John George was utterly consistent: he was, as Wedgwood says, devoted to the constitution and the German liberties, i.e., when there was no hope of maintaining the German liberties at the side of the Emperor, he supported Gustavus Adolphus; but as soon as that hope was restored, his fidelity to the constitution, his loathing of revolt, his opposition to foreign intervention (which was the same thing as loyalty to the constitution) mandated his return to the Emperor. But let us return to Wedgwood, and her final estimation of the man, an estimation again which indicates no enigma but a policy consistently pursued:

Posterity has not been kind to John George and his advisors. As the defenders of a nebulous constitution and a divided people they had a thankless task, and as
events showed they performed it badly, but the Elector must at least have credit for some qualities unusual enough in the years to come. He was always honest, he always said what he meant, he worked sincerely for peace and for the commonweal of Germany, and if now and again he put Saxony first and grasped more than he should for himself, the fault was of his time and at least he never asked the foreigner to help him. History knows him as the man who betrayed the Protestants in 1620, the Emperor in 1631, the Swedes in 1635. In fact he was almost the only man who preserved a consistent policy among the veering schemes of enemies and allies.  

Among the better (better documented and more detailed) studies of the behavior of John George is the above mentioned study of the Regensburger Reichstag of 1640-41 by Kathrin Bierther. Before she details the policies of John George at that Reichstag, she gives a good summary of his behavior to that point. She has not the least difficulty in divining a constant and not at all surprising policy in the Elector's actions. While she grants that his behavior was in his own territorial and dynastic interests, it should be noted that that behavior was also very consistent with his professed religious convictions. Thus he does not abandon the Emperor until Ferdinand has abandoned his constitutional promises and made it clear by the Edict of Restitution that the Elector's rights in law will be trampled underfoot at the first opportunity, along with the rights of all the other (at least non-Catholic) estates. Not in haste, but only after that is beyond doubt, does John George ally himself with the Swedes, and then only for so long as is absolutely necessary to turn the Emperor away from his illegal and violently reactionary schemes. It should further be noted that in the furthering of his own dynastic and territorial interests, John George is not really very greedy: he seeks assurances of control over those territories which (particularly ecclesiastical estates and institutions) had traditionally been in the province of his House. While many of these matters will be dealt with below in their turn, Bierther's summary of them is worthy of note at this point as we examine the character of the
Elector and his policies. Let the reader note in that summary the Elector's consistency, his loyalty to law (which meant loyalty to the Emperor so long as such loyalty was constitutional), his loyalty as well to the principle that matters of religion should not be matters of violence and war (in his spirit of territorial compromise for the sake of religious peace) -- a totally un-Calvinist and un-Catholic, but distinctly Lutheran position:

Bis zu Beginn der dreissinger Jahre und dann wieder seit dem Abschluss des Prager Friedans bewegte sich die Politik des Kurfürsten Johann Georg I. von Sachsen ganz in den traditionellen Bahnen der kursächsischen Politik, die durch Loyalität dem Kaiser gegenüber, durch die Abneigung, die zwischen den beiden konfessionparteien schwebenden Streitfragen auf die Spitze zu treiben und auf diese Weise einen bewaffneten Konflikt zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten im Reich zu provozieren, sowie durch Festhalten an der überlieferten Form der Reichsverfassung in ihrer kaiserlich-kurfürstlichen Interpretation charakterisiert war. Der zu Beginn der dreissiger Jahre vollzogene Kurwechsel war vornehmlich von territorialstaatlichen und dynastischen Interessen diktiert, die in der Politik des Kurfürsten von Sachsen eine ebenso grosse Rolle spielten wie in der Politik des Kaisers und der Kurfürsten von Bayern und Brandenburg.

(But, let the reader recall, the pursuit of those interest did no violence to the constitution, religious freedoms, or the rights of the other princes and estates -- unlike the manner in which Ferdinand II and Maximilian I of Bavaria pursued their interests.)

Wie Herzog Maximilian von Bayern, so liess sich auch Kurfürst Johann Georg von Sachsen die Parteinhaltung für Ferdinand II. und die Waffenhilfe, die er dem Kaiser und der Liga bei der Widerstandung des böhmischen Aufstandes leistete, bezahlen; und zwar forderte er vollen Ersatz seiner Kriegskosten sowie eine Garantie für den Besitz der dem kursächsischen Territorium bereits im 16. Jahrhundert einverleibten Stifter Meissen, Merseburg und Naumburg. Für seine auf dreihalf Millionen Reichstaler veranschlagten Kriegskosten verpfändete Ferdinand II. ihm die Ober- und Niederlausitz. Was die sächsischen Stifter anging,


In the pages following those cited, Bierther details how John George continued at the Regensburg Reichstag to pursue this consistent, ultimately ironic and
distinctly Lutheran position and policy. He refused for example to attempt to play the role of successor to Frederick V as a strong director of a united Protestant front; he wanted to avoid every appearance of provocation, lest the suspicions of the Catholics be aroused, the negotiations made more difficult, and the War consequently prolonged. There is nothing surprising, nothing confusing, nothing enigmatic in his instructions to his representatives; they are, again, altogether consistent, ironic, Lutheran.  

Even when his "Amnestiepolitik" tilts perhaps more toward the Catholic position than was necessary or desirable, it is still consistent, given and compared with the revolutionary position of the radical Protestants.

Again, it cannot be denied that the Elector often found ways to turn his alliances to his advantage, and changes in alliances did not ignore such advantage, e.g., as mentioned above by Bierther, the first rank in causes for his going to the support of the Swedes is the rejection of the claims to Magdeburg for his own son; it cannot be forgotten, of course, that his son's rights in Magdeburg were already precarious on account of George William's designs on the archbishopric. But were such advantages primary in the over all policy of the Elector? Could it not be argued that had he forgotten his Lutheran principles and allied himself with neighboring Bohemia and the German Protestant Union, he could have served those interests at least as well at the expense of Hapsburg and other Catholic ecclesiastical estates? As to Gindel's pointed (cited above, p.5) that the Elector feared the loss of his Electoral title to the Weimar dukes in the event that he supported the Bohemians and the Union, it should be noted that the Weimar dukes were unlikely to trust the Emperor whose House had robbed them of the dignity in the first place; they had no greater love for the Hapsburgs than they did for their Dresden cousins. We will grant that John George's policy was prompted by "religious, dynastic and personal" motives — but in that order; for he could
Before the end of 1610, the Catholic League had a standing army of more than 25,000, the patronage and protection of Philip III, subsidies from Philip, the active support of the three ecclesiastical Electors and twenty other territorial rulers. Maximilian was an ardent champion of the Catholic Reaction, at least in the lands under his own control. He was utterly ruthless in rooting out Lutherans and Calvinists alike, first in Bavaria itself, then (as noted above) in Donauwörth, and later (during the War) in those parts of Austria assigned to him by Ferdinand until Ferdinand's war debts to Bavaria could be paid. His court was home and haven to Jesuits, and his training had been Jesuit led and inspired. The religious policies of their disciple more than repaid the apostles of the Reaction. Maximilian was as ruthless in politics as he was in religion. (Once again, the shameless motto of, "The end justifies the means," haunts a disciple of the Jesuits.) To the Bavarian duke whatever was good for the Bavarian duke was good, and whatever did not serve his own narrow interests was bad. In the early years of the War, it served his purposes to support the Emperor (to whom he was related by marriage) and thus to champion centralization. Before the War, he had treated his Wittelsbach cousins in the Palatinate with unaccustomed friendship; but as soon as the prospect of their fall presented itself, he bargained secretly with his relatives in Vienna to accomplish a trade of his support for the Electoral dignity and lands of the unhappy Frederick. Once he had all he wanted from the Emperor, he just as suddenly became a champion of the German liberties, and demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein. At the same time that he had become a reconverted champion of the German liberties, he was making alliances with the French. In his own lands, when he was not rooting out heresy and joining in the interrogation of suspected witches on the rack, he built schools and hospitals and fostered the arts. But that apparent good was more than counter-balanced by his ceaseless and Puritan rigor in making sure that the peasants were virtuous
and that his own servants were paid as little as possible, perhaps to save 
them from the vices of affluence. When, during the final phase of the War, 
Maximilian's lands too were devastated as the lands of so many others had been 
with his earnest support, many might be forgiven a faint smile of satisfaction 
that he received what he had so generously given; by that time, of course, 
there were few left who could smile or have anything to smile about. In sum, 
Maximilian was a gifted and able prince, a grasping, blood thirsty bigot; had 
he been at all high minded, he could have saved Germany from the blood bath of 
the War, and he alone; for Ferdinand could not have taken the Bohemian rebellion 
into Germany without Maximilian. Among Lutheran and Calvinists alike in Austria, 
Bohemia, Bavaria, the Palatine and the north German duchies, his name lives 
in infamy the like of which is shared by few others. 

Frederick V

In the Elector Palatine and the Winter King of Bohemia we have the Protestant 
Calvinist counter-part to Maximilian I of Bavaria. Like his Bavarian cousin, 
Frederick had great ambitions and as a Calvinist was not averse to shedding 
other people's blood in order to achieve them. But there the comparison ends. 
Frederick had neither the wealth nor the political sagacity to match Maxi-
milian. Unlike Maximilian, who never ceased in his activity, Frederick appears 
to have been a bit lazy. He inherited the leading role in the Protestant 
Union from his father, Elector Frederick IV when the latter died in September 
of 1610. The Union had been formed in 1608 as a Protestant reaction to the 
tragic events in Donauwörth. From the beginning, it was chiefly a Calvinist 
organ, though a few of the Lutheran cities in the south of Germany had also 
joined it in fear of attack by Maximilian. The Union often tried to win the 
support of Lutheran Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt, but it never succeeded. An 
examination of its activities when compared with the Lutheran principles with 
regard to rebellion make it clear very quickly that the Union was incompatable
with Lutheran orthodoxy. Frederick V simply proceeded with the un-Lutheran policies of his father in the Union, acting through the arch-Calvinist Christian von Anhalt. Christian von Anhalt and his Wittelsbach patrons envisioned a grand Protestant anti-Hapsburg alliance with the Dutch and the English. The Dutch supported the Union with subsidies — with 1621 drawing closer, they had reasons of their own for wanting friends in the Empire. The English gave their support in the person of the only surviving daughter of James I, Princess Elizabeth. The Elector Palatine held lands of strategic importance to the anti-Hapsburg alliance, a fifty mile stretch of territory which blocked the way of Spanish troops on the way to the Netherlands. But those lands and the alliance of Calvinists within Germany were not enough to bring about the downfall of the Hapsburgs: from London through the Netherlands and down to Heidelberg one dream lived in the hearts of the Calvinists: the toppling of the Hapsburgs in Bohemia. For so long as a Hapsburg was king of Bohemia the Electoral College would remain Catholic for the purposes of the Imperial Election. But if the Calvinists of Bohemia would elect a Calvinist — or even, if it had to be, a Lutheran king — Hapsburg power and Catholic power in the Electoral College would be broken. From the age of 14, Frederick was moulded by his father, Christian von Anhalt, and the court chaplain for this role of Protestant champion by way of marriage and Bohemia. With the solid Protestant marriage accomplished in 1613, there but remained the death of the childless Matthias for the plats to be given life. That Ferdinand had already been accepted as king-designate and was in fact accepted and elected as king was but a temporary inconvenience: revolt, that dreaded word to the Lutherans, revolt would make everything right from a Calvinist point of view. In Bohemia the schemes of Christian von Anhalt in behalf of his master were not without support. To be sure, the Lutherans had been panicked by the revolutionary radicalism of the Calvinist minority in Bohemia; that radicalism
and their inherent loathing of violence and revolt were without doubt factors in their support of the Hapsburgs. The Lutheran leader, the soon to be tragic figure, Count Schlick, was no match for the Calvinist plotters both outside and inside of Bohemia. The task of chief plotter within Bohemia fell to the mercurial, ambitious, hot-headed Count Thurn, who had interests in the Empire as well as smaller ones in Bohemia. As may readily be seen from the above, Frederick himself was a warm body and not much more in the Calvinist scenario. But he was more than willing to be used by his co-religionist, most importantly Christian von Anhalt, and then in his turn, Count Thurn; and therefore, Frederick V must bear the responsibility of the disasters which followed him as he followed them. He allowed himself to be put at the head of a revolt; that he had neither an understanding of its end at the beginning, nor the requisite political and military and intellectual gifts to pull it off will not excuse him. From Frederick’s own point of view, what he was doing was the will of God, and God would see to its success; to put it another way, his actions and intentions were consistent with a Calvinist view of the world and of the state within the Empire; those who acted in his name shared that view and were motivated by it. 

John George I

We have left consideration of John George I, Elector of Saxony from 1611-1656, to the last of our characterizations in order to focus the more sharply on the crucial question of this entire study. If we ask the question: Did the Elector John George act before and during the Thirty Years' War in a manner consistent with the above described principles of Lutheran orthodoxy? the answer is much clearer when set in the context of the behavior and the character of the above mentioned Ferdinand II, Maximilian I, and Frederick V (together with his co-religionists). Did the first two act consistently with the principles of the Catholic Reaction? Most certainly they did at least
until 1635. Did Frederick and his advisors act in a manner which faithfully reflected the attitudes of Zwingli and Calvin in their day? Who would argue that they most certainly did. But, as has already been intimated, when the Lutherans and their leaders are considered, the question is invariably misframed; the question is rarely: Did they act consistently in accord with Lutheran principles? It almost always is: Why were they such poor or cowardly or inconsistent or inconstant Protestants? An altogether unfair question, since they never claimed to be political or religious kinsmen of the Calvinists, and had very good reason for refusing to be thus identified. To put it simply, no one should have expected them as Lutheran to behave much differently than they did; it is unfair to judge them by a Calvinist standard.

Precisely because of the common practice of judging John George by an unfair standard, the attacks on him have likewise been unfair, not to say harsh. He is called "an enigma," indecisive, confused, unfaithful. But when considered according to the traditional parameters and standards of Saxon politics, there is very little that is confused or enigmatic in John George's behavior. Since the time of the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, Saxon policies have been dominated by two complementary principles: 1) a Lutheran loathing of revolutionary radicalism, as embodied in an assortment of Calvinist-lead political schemes and alliances which could only end in military confrontation, civil war; this principle kept Saxon policies loyal to the integrity of the Empire; that integrity from a Saxon point of view could best be maintained with Hapsburgs on the imperial throne; a Calvinist Emperor could only mean radicalism which would push the Catholics revolt and involve the Empire in foreign wars on its western frontiers for the advancement of the Calvinist theocracy, particularly in France and Holland. To be sure, the Hapsburgs of Vienna had equal and opposite interest in fighting in France and Holland by way of the Spanish connection and the traditional rivalry between the Hapsburgs and the French. But the
Hapsburg ambition could be checkmated effectively in the Kurfürstenrat and in the Reichstag by the simple expedient of refusing to allow foreign troops in Germany and refusing to vote the taxes necessary for pursuing wars against the French. 2) The second engine which had driven Saxon policies was the defense of the German liberties against absolutist pretentions of strong emperors. Since the time of the Peace of Augsburg, support of the Hapsburg candidates for the Imperial crown had appeared the safest way to pursue this policy goal as well as that of the integrity of the Empire. To support someone like Frederick IV or V for the Imperial crown, with their strong standing armies inside of the Empire rather than a weak Hapsburg whose armies were in Austria, Hungary and Bohemia did not make much sense from the standpoint of the safety of the liberties of the individual German estates. To support Maximilian I, also rich and powerful inside of Germany, instead of Ferdinand who had troubles aplenty to occupy him in Hungary, Austria and -- sadly -- Bohemia, also did not make much sense. (The Calvinists had toyed with the idea of supporting Maximilian as an alternative to Ferdinand, but the plan floundered for lack of enthusiastic and decisive support from Maximilian.)

In short, an examination of the behavior of John George in the light of these two principles will show that his behavior in the main was consistent, even predictable, and not at all confused or enigmatic. That is not to say that John George was a political genius or even a perfect Lutheran. He had his faults. Too many historians, however, failing to perceive his principles at work, content themselves with pointing out his faults and dismissing him on their account. Thus Steinberg, who rarely shows much sympathy for anyone in the German tragedy, is particularly scathing in his dismissal of John George:

If the policies of Saxony as well as Brandenburg lacked any purposeful drive during the greater part of the first half of the seventeenth century, the fault lay mainly in the incompetence and lassitude of their rulers. John George
I of Saxony (1611-56) and George William of Brandenburg (1619-40) vied with each other in sluggishness and prevarication. Both spent the greater part of their lives besotted behind their beer-mugs; both had a special gift of alienating honest advisers, and both tamely submitted to the evil counsels of men who were open to shameless bribery by foreign potentates. 24

Even Wedgewood admits, and we cannot deny it:

... John George had preserved the good old German custom of carousing in a manner that shocked men under French or Spanish influence, Frederick of the Palatinate and Ferdinand of Styria. John George, who scorned foreign delicacies, had been known to sit at table gorging homely foods and swilling native beer for seven hours on end, his sole approach at conversation to box his dwarf's ears, or pour the dregs of a tankard over a servant's head as a signal for more. He was not a confirmed drunkard; his brain when he was sober was perfectly clear, and he drank through habit and good fellowship rather than weakness. But he drank too much and too often. Later on it became the fashion to say whenever he made an inept political decision that he had been far gone at the time, and the dispatches of one ambassador at least are punctuated with such remarks as, "He began to be somewhat heated with wine," and "He seemed to me to be very drunk." It made diplomacy difficult.

But Wedgewood, though holding to the view that John George was enigmatic in his policies, keeping everyone in the dark -- probably himself included -- as to the direction he would take and the side he would favor, goes on to point out his virtues as well as she had pointed up his faults. Indeed, in her very defense of his virtues and the manner in which he practiced them she makes a good case for his consistency and predictability. She points out that he was good Lutheran family man, who conscientiously strove to carry out his principles. He faithfully attended services with his family at his court chapel three times a week and regularly received the Sacrament as a devout Lutheran. And then, appearing to contradict her view that John George was enigmatic and confused, she says:
He wanted above all peace, commercial prosperity, and the integrity of Germany; unlike Frederick or Ferdinand he had no mission and did not wish to risk present comfort for doubtful future good. Seeing that the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was in danger of collapsing, he knew no remedy save that of shoring it up again. Between the two parties that were wrenching the structure apart, between German liberties and Hapsburg absolutism, he stood for the solidarity of ancient things. First and last he was a constitutionalist.

Does that not sound like a policy? She goes on:

Of the three leaders he was probably the most intelligent, but he had neither Ferdinand’s self-confidence nor Frederick’s confidence in others; he was one of those who, seeing both sides to every question, have not the courage to choose. When he did act his motives were wise, honest and constructive, but always acted too late.

But didn’t he choose? There was never any doubt about his sympathies during the Bohemian revolt nor for that matter about his sympathies during the rest of the War, as we shall see. The only doubt was: Could Ferdinand finally push the Catholic policy of Reaction so far that even John George would take to the field against him? When that question was finally answered, no one, including Gustavus Adolphus and his advisors, ever doubted that at the first opportunity John George would return to the side of the Emperor. That was clear to one and all, precisely because the policy of John George was utterly consistent: he was, as Wedgwood says, devoted to the constitution and the German liberties, i.e., when there was no hope of maintaining the German liberties at the side of the Emperor, he supported Gustavus Adolphus; but as soon as that hope was restored, his fidelity to the constitution, his loathing of revolt, his opposition to foreign intervention (which was the same thing as loyalty to the constitution) mandated his return to the Emperor. But let us return to Wedgwood, and her final estimation of the man, an estimation again which indicates no enigma but a policy consistently pursued:

Posterity has not been kind to John George and his advisors. As the defenders of a nebulous constitution and a divided people they had a thankless task, and as
events showed they performed it badly, but the Elector must at least have credit for some qualities unusual enough in the years to come. He was always honest, he always said what he meant, he worked sincerely for peace and for the commonweal of Germany, and if now and again he put Saxony first and grasped more than he should for himself, the fault was of his time and at least he never asked the foreigner to help him. History knows him as the man who betrayed the Protestants in 1620, the Emperor in 1631, the Swedes in 1635. In fact he was almost the only man who preserved a consistent policy among the veering schemes of enemies and allies. 25

Among the better (better documented and more detailed) studies of the behavior of John George is the above mentioned study of the Regensburger Reichstag of 1640-41 by Kathrin Bierther. Before she details the policies of John George at that Reichstag, she gives a good summary of his behavior to that point. She has not the least difficulty in divining a constant and not at all surprising policy in the Elector's actions. While she grants that his behavior was in his own territorial and dynastic interests, it should be noted that that behavior was also very consistent with his professed religious convictions. Thus he does not abandon the Emperor until Ferdinand has abandoned his constitutional promises and made it clear by the Edict of Restitution that the Elector's rights in law will be trampled underfoot at the first opportunity, along with the rights of all the other (at least non-Catholic) estates. Not in haste, but only after that is beyond doubt, does John George ally himself with the Swedes, and then only for so long as is absolutely necessary to turn the Emperor away from his illegal and violently reactionary schemes. It should further be noted that in the furthering of his own dynastic and territorial interests, John George is not really very greedy: he seeks assurances of control over those territories which (particularly ecclesiastical estates and institutions) had traditionally been in the province of his House. While many of these matters will be dealt with below in their turn, Bierther's summary of them is worthy of note at this point as we examine the character of the
Elector and his policies. Let the reader note in that summary the Elector's consistency, his loyalty to law (which meant loyalty to the Emperor so long as such loyalty was constitutional), his loyalty as well to the principle that matters of religion should not be matters of violence and war (in his spirit of territorial compromise for the sake of religious peace) — a totally un-Calvinist and un-Catholic, but distinctly Lutheran position:

Bis zu Beginn der dreissiger Jahre und dann wieder seit dem Abschluss des Prager Friedens bewegte sich die Politik des Kurfürsten Johann Georg I. von Sachsen ganz in den traditionellen Bahnen der kursächsischen Politik, die durch Loyalität dem Kaiser gegenüber, durch die Abneigung, die zwischen den beiden konfessionsparteiischen schwebenden Streitfragen auf die Spitze zu treiben und auf diese Weise einen bewaffneten Konflikt zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten im Reich zu provozieren, sowie durch Festhalten an der überlieferten Form der Reichsverfassung in ihrer kaiserlich-kurfürstlichen Interpretation charakterisiert war. Der zu Beginn der dreissiger Jahre vollzogene Kurwechsel war vornehmlich von territorialstaatlichen und dynastischen Interessen diktiert, die in der Politik des Kurfürsten von Sachsen eine ebenso grosse Rolle spielten wie in der Politik des Kaisers und der Kurfürsten von Bayern und Brandenburg.

(But, let the reader recall, the pursuit of those interest did no violence to the constitution, religious freedoms, or the rights of the other princes and estates — unlike the manner in which Ferdinand II and Maximilian I of Bavaria pursued their interests.)

Wie Herzog Maximilian von Bayern, so liess sich auch Kurfürst Johann Georg von Sachsen die Parteinehme für Ferdinand II. und die Waffenhilfe, die er dem Kaiser und der Liga bei der Wiederherstellung des böhmischen Aufstandes leistete, bezahlen; und zwar forderte er vollen Ersatz seiner Kriegskosten sowie eine Garantie für den Besitz der dem kursächsischen Territorium bereits im 16. Jahrhundert einverleibten Stifter Meißen, Merseburg und Naumburg. Für seine auf dreienhalb Millionen Reichstaler veranschlagten Kriegskosten verpfändete Ferdinand II. ihm die Ober- und Niederlausitz. Was die sächsischen Stifter anging,


In the pages following those cited, Bierther details how John George continued at the Regensburg Reichstag to pursue this consistent, ultimately ironic and
distinctly Lutheran position and policy. He refused for example to attempt to play the role of successor to Frederick V as a strong director of a united Protestant front; he wanted to avoid every appearance of provocation, lest the suspicions of the Catholics be aroused, the negotiations made more difficult, and the War consequently prolonged. There is nothing surprising, nothing confusing, nothing enigmatic in his instructions to his representatives; they are, again, altogether consistent, irenic, Lutheran. Even when his "Amnestie-politik" tilts perhaps more toward the Catholic position than was necessary or desirable, it is still consistent, given and compared with the revolutionary position of the radical Protestants.

Again, it cannot be denied that the Elector often found ways to turn his alliances to his advantage, and changes in alliances did not ignore such advantage, e.g., as mentioned above by Bierther, the first rank in causes for his going to the support of the Swedes is the rejection of the claims to Magdeburg for his own son; it cannot be forgotten, of course, that his son's rights in Magdeburg were already precarious on account of George William's designs on the archbishopric. But were such advantages primary in the overall policy of the Elector? Could it not be argued that had he forgotten his Lutheran principles and allied himself with neighboring Bohemia and the German Protestant Union, he could have served those interests at least as well at the expense of Hapsburg and other Catholic ecclesiastical estates? As to Gindely's pointed (cited above, p.5) that the Elector feared the loss of his Electoral title to the Weimar dukes in the event that he supported the Bohemians and the Union, it should be noted that the Weimar dukes were unlikely to trust the Emperor whose House had robbed them of the dignity in the first place; they had no greater love for the Hapsburgs than they did for their Dresden cousins. We will grant that John George's policy was prompted by "religious, dynastic and personal" motives — but in that order; for he could
easily have conjugated his dynastic and personal interests differently and so arrive at a policy like that of Frederick and his allies. But he could not as a loyal Lutheran act much differently than he did and still be a loyal Lutheran.

Efforts were made by the Union, predominantly Calvinist though it was, to move the Elector, but they were all in vain. As early as 1608 in the articles by which the Union was formed all members agreed "to try to influence other Protestant Estates i.e., Saxony towards an understanding with us." But typical of his response is that which he gave to some of the estates of the Lower Saxon Circle, when in 1615 they urged John George to join the Union. He declares that he appreciates their concerns for the defense of the German liberties, but insists that their preservation is not secured but threatened by Protestants building armies and preparing for war. For such activity can only provoke -- as of course it had already done -- the Catholics to respond in kind. Instead of joining the call to arms, John George pleads for a return to respect for the Empire and its institutions; he assures the Circle that he is unaware of any explicit threat to their liberties from the Emperor, and maintains that both he and the Catholics are striving for the preservation of the religious peace which both parties want to preserve.

Nor had his labors for peace and understanding been totally fruitless, in spite of the deteriorating situation in the Empire. Indeed, from the Elector's point of view, the situation would not have deteriorated so rapidly, had the Calvinists shown the least willingness to compromise. On August 13, 1613, for example, the Emperor Matthias met his first Reichstag. He was seeking aid against the Turks who were again marching on the Hungarian frontier. In spite of the reservations of the Catholic princes, Matthias expressed a willingness to be conciliatory towards Protestant interests in matters of the
Ecclesiastical Reservation clause, to summon a commission of composition in Speier made up of equal representation between Catholic and Protestant estates to consider other religious gravamina, and even to make reforms in the hopelessly partial Reichskammergericht. But each grant only provoked greater demands from the Calvinists. The aid for which the Emperor was being so compliant was finally voted -- but without the support of the Calvinists: Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt voted with the Catholics to give the necessary assistance.\(^\text{31}\)

To the very last days before the outbreak of the Bohemian rebellion John George labored to establish peace; he knew well that a revolt in Bohemia during an imperial election would be a disaster, involving the Elector Palatine and thus the Union and all of Germany. But the Protestants were stubbornly resistant to his efforts. At length he, together with the Duke of Bavaria (whose appetite for gain at the expense of all and sundry had not yet been fully aroused) succeeded in arranging for a general conference to discuss the crisis at Eger in April, 1619. But it was too late for peace in the fatherland: Matthias died on March 20, 1619.\(^\text{32}\)

Thus ended the crisis, and thus began the crucible.
II. The Crucible (1618-1648)

It is not our intention here to detail the tragedy that was the Thirty Years' War. The broad outlines of the War and the activities of its major participants are either sufficiently well known or so easily accessible as to make that unnecessary. Rather we shall concentrate our attention specifically on the role of Saxony's Elector John George I. For he, together with his shadows in Hesse-Darmstadt, was the pre-eminent representative of the distinctly Lutheran camp during the War. Furthermore, we shall concentrate our attention on the first period of the War, the Bohemian revolt, and give less attention to the years following 1623. That expedient has been made necessary by the fact that primary sources simply are not available for the years following 1622, except for those contained in Gindely's work; Lundorp's documents in his nine volumes are all but indispensible as a primary source; unfortunately only the first two and the last are available locally. The first two close with documents from 1623, and the last volume covers events beyond the scope of this paper.

In 1618 the Emperor Matthias was tottering towards the grave. Ferdinand of Styria had, in typically Hapsburg fashion, already been designated his successor in Hungary and Austria, and had as well been accepted by the Bohemian Estates as their elected king. Though his training by the Jesuits and his devotion to the Catholic Reaction had already been demonstrated in Styria and were sufficiently well known, Ferdinand had promised to uphold the Letter of Majesty in Bohemia and Silesia. The reluctance of the Reichstag to grant him aid in men and money to fight the again advancing Turks and the consequent need for a relatively stable Hungary assured the turbulent Hungarians that they too would be left in possession of their religious liberties. But Protestant radicalism was not content to leave well enough alone. In Hungary the Calvinist
Bethlen Gabor was ever at the ready to plunge his supporters and the Hapsburgs into civil war. In Bohemia the Estates were easily provoked into demanding more concessions from the Hapsburgs than they could ever grant, concessions both of a political and a religious nature. The fuse for the lighting and welding together of these two eastern tinder boxes was the impending Imperial election. The German Electors were split down the middle along religious lines: the three ecclesiastical Electors could be expected to support the Hapsburg Ferdinand; but with the apostacy of the House of Hohenzollern there were now two Calvinist Electors, plus the Lutheran Elector of Saxony. If the Lutheran Elector could be pried away from the support for the Hapsburgs, the Electoral College would be deadlocked, the King of Bohemia alone would elect the next Emperor.

What visions must have danced in the head of the devoted Calvinist advisors to Fréderick V, the Elector Palatine: if the Bohemians could be provoked to reject Ferdinand and elect a non-Catholic king, and that before the death of Matthias, the long awaited departure of the Hapsburgs from the Imperial throne would be -- almost -- assured. And, dare he hope for such a thing, if the Bohemians could be induced to elect their young master as king, then the Palatine branch of the House of Wittelsbach would itself have two votes, the Calvinist Hohenzollerns a third, and the Lutheran Wettins the fourth: a clear Protestant majority, which might even be induced to elect Frederick Holy Roman Emperor -- heaven might well be in reach! Again such a background and with such visions the devoted advisor, Christian of Anhalt bent his considerable energies to the back stage agitation of the Calvinist minority in Bohemia, drawing even some Lutherans and Catholics into his schemes in the name of national liberties.

The plots had already born considerable fruit when the Emperor died. The Defenestration of Prague brought the Bohemian Estates into revolt with
the promise of support from the Hungarian Calvinists, should it be necessary, and with the expectation of aid from the Calvinist and Palatine dominated Union in Germany. The French, never saddened by the humiliation of a Hapsburg, the Dutch, hoping for an event to distract the Hapsburgs from their own lands as the 1621 date of the Spanish-Dutch truce lapse approached, and the English, whose king had given his only daughter in marriage to Frederick, -- all might champion the cause of the Bohemian Estates, especially if Frederick was elected king. 1619 was the fateful year: Ferdinand was deposed, Matthias died, and a scant two days before the scheduled Imperial election, the Estates of Bohemia met to elect their new king. Only two candidates were nominated, the Lutheran Elector of Saxony and the Calvinist Elector Palatine. The moderate and Lutheran Count Schlick labored for the election of John George and the Calvinist Count Thurn worked in behalf of Frederick V.\(^1\) John George did little or nothing to encourage his own election; indeed, had he been elected, he would have used the pro-offered crown only to negotiate peace between the Bohemians and Ferdinand, asking only the guarantee of Protestant rights in return.\(^2\) But the moderate Lutherans were swept aside in the election by the ever more militant radicals, and Frederick was elected by a vote of 146 to 7. So much for the radical ascendancy -- that was the end of it.

It was time for the Catholic Reaction to begin its long, dark day. On August 28, 1619, the Electors or their representatives (only the three ecclesiastical Electors were there in person) met in Frankfurt to cast their votes. Ferdinand arrived in state, wearing "a new and hastily contrived diadem," as King of Bohemia. The news had not yet reached Frankfurt that the Bohemians had elected a new king, and a delegation of rebels from Prague was accordingly dismissed without much ado. Thus with the assured voted of the three ecclesiastical Electors and his own as King of Bohemia, Ferdinand's election was assured.
The representative of the Elector Palatine sputtered and fumed, but all to no avail — he proposed Maximilian, but Maximilian did not want the crown, nor did John George, and any prospects that Frederick himself might have had were reduced to the laughable in a moment. The representative of John George also voted for Ferdinand.

He had no alternative, for his master had dispatched him to Frankfort with the discouraging words, "I know no good will come of it, I know Ferdinand," but had not indicated whom else he should support. The Elector, it was said, had been drunk at the time; but the same judgment might well have been given with complete sobriety.3

The representative of Brandenburg did the obvious, and he likewise voted for Ferdinand. With no one else to vote for, even the Palatine vote ended up being cast for the House of Hapsburg. Ferdinand, apparently considering the whole business an anticlimax, "flipped over the pages [of the Wahlcapitulation] with disconcerting rapidity and stood up to take the oath with as little gravity as if he had been stepping out to a dance."4 Among other things, Ferdinand promised to make no major decisions affecting the Empire without first consulting the Electors, and not to impose the imperial ban without giving a hearing to the accused.5 The Capitulation was essentially the same as that which had been imposed on Rudolph and Matthias.6 The stage was set for the struggle to begin between the Catholic Reaction and the Calvinist Radicalism. Only the path of Lutheran moderation had remained as an alternative to that struggle until the election of Frederick as King of Bohemia. But that path was now blocked, and all that remained was the determination of the price that the Hapsburgs would have to pay for the pivotal support of the Lutherans. Perhaps in that price there would still be hope of a short and limited war as distinguished from a long and pan-German conflagration.

The year 1620 was to prove fateful both politically and religiously for Saxony and thus for Bohemia. To almost everyone with the hindsight of 400
years it is self-evident that the Elector of Saxony would support the Emperor. But the reasons for that support have been insufficiently analysed. Most important writers are content to look at only one side of the political equation at work in Saxony. Wedgwood, for example, contents herself with looking at the map: if Frederick were successful in Bohemia, Saxony would be outflanked and all but surrounded by competing houses, the Wittelsbacks in Bohemia and the Palatinate on the east and west, and the Hohenzollerns (whose Elector had married Frederick's sister) on the north. She mentions almost in passing the role of Hoß, the Dresden Court Chaplain, saying nothing more than:

John George's anxiety was fanned into active hatred by his Court preacher, the irascible Hoß who denounced the Bohemian government for having betrayed the Lutheran faith to the Calvinist Antichrist. He went further; he espoused without more ado the cause of the dispossessed Ferdinand.

To Wedgwood, then, the position of the Elector was dictated by political, territorial and dynastic considerations, with religious principles playing only a supporting role at best. In that analysis Wedgwood does little more than follow Gindely, who, as has already been noted, has little good to say about the motives of John George, and whose fury rises to a fevered pitch, whenever he has occasion to speak of the "irascible" Court chaplain to the Elector. As Gindely assumes that the actions of the Elector were dictated by fear of his Weimar cousins, so he also takes it for granted that the animosity of the chaplain was prompted by personal pique resulting from Hoß experiences in Prague:

Hoß had, several years before, experienced a deep mortification in Prague; he had settled there, after the granting of the Royal Charter, as preacher, and as he adhered decidedly to the Augsburg Confession, he fell into contention with the adherents of the Bohemian Confession, which ended with his being attacked in his house, insulted, and compelled to leave the country. In Dresden he found not only a friendly reception,
but a prominent position, which he was disposed to make use of to avenge the insult which he suffered. The imperial ambassador, Elvern, who met him at this time, wondered not a little at the hatred for the Bohemian rebels which the court preacher treasured in his heart, and remarked that he should not have deemed it possible that Hoë could be so attached to the Catholics as his utterances indicated. In view of these feelings of Hoë, it is readily conceived that the presents which Elvern brought to him in the Emperor's name were gratefully received, and had the effect of increasing his enmity towards the Bohemians. 8

Again: political, dynastic and territorial considerations dominate in the mind of the Elector, and the role of religious principle is all but eliminated, with those principles seen as little more than tools in one pastor's bag, which bag was made of the shabby and mixed cloth of fanaticism and avarice.

Such an analysis, however, simply will not do. If political, territorial and dynastic considerations were to carry the day in Dresden, then it would make at least as much sense for the Elector to side with the Calvinists as with the Hapsburgs. For an alliance of Lutheran Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt bolstered by the other Lutheran territories and imperial cities would have spelled doom for the Hapsburg interests in the Empire, especially since such a solid phalanx of the non-Catholic Estates could have counted on the acquiescence at the very least of Denmark, Sweden, France and the Netherlands. In exchange for such support, to be sure, the dreams of Hesse-Darmstadt to control over Hesse-Cassel would have to be sacrificed. But what was that compared to an undisputed control over Silesia and Lusatia and perhaps Moravia, not to mention the secularized ecclesiastical sees which had fallen to the House of Wettin during the preceding 100 years, which control would have been a small price indeed for Frederick to pay in order to secure the rest of Bohemia and the end of Hapsburg-Catholic hegemony in central Europe. Nor will it do to simply dismiss the Court chaplain's views as a personal matter for him, determined and normed by nothing more than experience, tinged perhaps with greed.
In point of fact the Elector's views and the animus of his chaplain were altogether consistent with the traditional Lutheran position with respect to the State, and the attitudes and actions of both were determined -- not merely influenced by -- that position. Once that position has made rebellion impossible, then and only then, can the Elector's political, territorial and dynastic considerations begin to exercise an influence and work their way through the negotiations with the Emperor, which considerations the Elector used to assist his co-religionists and to defend constitutional liberties, while at the same time serving his own House.

Lundorp has passed on to us in his mammoth collection of documents a number of letters and articles from the Lutheran chaplain and the two Lutheran universities which demonstrate the great interest of the Lutherans as Lutherans in the troubles plaguing the Empire in the period under consideration. The two universities were those in Wittenberg (under the patronage of the Elector) and in Jena (under the patronage of the Weimar dukes). The opinions of these two universities were earnestly sought by both the Elector and by Duke Johann Ernst of Saxe-Weimar as the princes charted their course over the turbulent waters of 1619-20. And the theologians in these two bastions of Lutheran orthodoxy were not bashful in rendering their thoroughly orthodox analysis of the current situation. Among the questions with which they wrestled were the following:

1) Can a prince remain neutral in a struggle between the Emperor and another prince?
2) Can a people rebel when their religious liberties are threatened or removed, so that the Gospel no longer has "free course to be preached to the joy and edifying of Christ's holy people?"
3) Can a faithful Lutheran prince side with the Emperor, when he knows that his support will serve the interests of the Jesuits to the enslaving of his fellow Lutherans in the cause of the Catholic Reaction?
4) Would not the support of the Calvinist radicals be at least the lessor of the two evils, if support of the papacy is the only alternative?
The Court Chaplain in Dresden and the theological faculties at the universities took great pains to treat these and related questions in a thoroughly biblical and historical frame work, a frame work which took great and obvious pains to condemn all considerations which might be self-seeking or merely convenient from a political, territorial or dynastic point of view. The above cited critics of the Elector have granted that he was a devoted Lutheran; accordingly, he cannot have ignored these views of the theologians and of his own pastor, especially since he himself eagerly solicited those views, and very much wanted to take them and the rationale behind them into account in his conduct. That he may have made mistakes in his application of those principles might be conceded. That he may even have carried their application too far might as well be granted. But that those principles were of paramount importance to the Elector in the normative period of the Bohemian rebellion we must steadfastly maintain. We are obliged to cite at some length both from the writings sent out from the universities and from the polemics that raged between Hoë and the ever fiery but always ananamous Calvinist radicals in Prague.

In January of 1620 Duke Johann Ernst of Saxe-Weimar submitted a series of questions to the theological faculty at Wittenberg through his own theologians at Jena (namely Johann Major and the famous orthodox Johann Gerhard). His questions, nine in number, were essentially the same as those suggested above. The theological faculty at Wittenberg answered immediately, and their answers were crystal clear, brief and to the point. They declared that the oath of submission, the love of God which we are obliged to show our neighbor, the honor of God which requires our obedience to his secular representatives, all these gave the faithful Christian no choice but to come to the assistance of the Emperor; even if the Emperor should abuse that assistance in the service of the pope, the aid was not being granted to the Emperor as a Catholic, but to the Emperor as Emperor; accordingly, if he misused and abused it, he would
have to answer to God for that. But, in any event, the sins of one cannot be
used as a cover to excuse the sins of the faithful. ¹⁰

A much lengthier document treating the same questions in an exhaustive
manner was addressed by the faculty at Wittenberg¹¹ and the Court Chaplain
Dr. Hoë to the dukes and to the Elector of Saxony, also in 1620. If the docu-
ment is compared with the writings of Luther previously cited, it becomes clear
at once that its fervor and its message are altogether consistent with Luther
and the Lutheran Confessions and the whole Lutheran behavior and mind-set from
1521 on. As well they clearly demonstrate that the Lutheran behavior in the
Bohemian revolt was motivated by much deeper and more profound considerations
than mere personal animus and self-interest (in the case of the Elector) or
petty pride and greed (in the case of the Court chaplain). The theologians
take great pains to demonstrate that Lutherans cannot be confused with Calvin-
ists (in answer to the question: How can a Lutheran prince aid a Catholic in
crushing the Calvinists, "our brothers");, and to show that in upholding the
Emperor and the Empire Lutherans are but obeying God's command that they submit
to the authorities God has placed over them, and keep their vows, no matter how
inconvenient or distasteful that may at times become. Thus:

Dieweil gewiss ist/ ob wir wol an den Papisten der Lehr
halb sehr viel tadeln/ wie in dem andern Theil dieses
Buchs ausführlich zu befinden/ Dannoch die Lutherschen
unnd die Romanisten einander in der Religion näher ver-
wandt sind/ dann die Calvinisten/ welches auss dieser
kurzen Erzählung offenbahr seyn soll. [He then goes on
to list the many theological differences between Lutherans
and Calvinists.]

Wann dann nun ein Christlich Hertz diese einige Ursach
beherziget/ und die grosse Differentien der Religion
halb erwegen/ so bin ich gewiss/ er wird sich mit weiter
hock verwundern/ dass wir Lutherschen (wie man uns
nennet) mit den Calvinisten und falsch genannten Reform-
mirten/ nit grosse Gemeinschaft/ Freundschaft/Brüders-
schaft/ Verbungtnuss/ unnd was deessleichen mehr ist/
machen können.¹²
...dass wir das Römisch Reich der Religion halb zu-
reissen/ sondern so viel an uns ist/ Fleiss fürwenden
sollen/ dass dasselb ein Corpus bleiben möge/ so be-
tragen sich die Lutherische mit den Papisten in welt-
lchen Sachen gültlich/ nehmen den auffgerichten Reli-
gions=Frieden/ als ein nützliches Band/ dar durch das
Reich zusammen gehalten wird/ und als ein Gottes Gabe/
mit Danck auff/ verwahren denselben/ und hüten/ dass
nirgends kein Joch darem gemacht werde/ leisten ihrem
Köyser nach Vermögen einen getreuen Beystand wider den
Orientalischen Antichrist und Tyrannen/ als der das
Röm. Reich oppugniret/ und befehlen sich also/ dass
sie die Wahrheit gegen Gott/ und den Frieden gegen den
Menschen erhalten/ so lange sie Gott in dieser Welt
wil lebel lassen.

...dass die Lutherischen wider Gott nicht handeln/
auch sonst nicht unrecht thun/ wann sie in Polit-
ischen Sachen/ zu Erhaltung dass H.Römisichen Reichs/
sich friedlich mit den Papisten begehen/ unn ich
entgegen/ so viel möglicher/ der Calvinisten entschlagen.
Dann dieses nunmehr offenbahr und unlangbahr ist/ wann
sich die Papisten zu uns halten/ dass sie er nur dass
äusserlichen Friedens halben thun/ Wann aber die Cal-
vinisten sich bey uns zugeschmiegen/ so ist es ihnen
darumb zu thun/ dass sie uns ihren beylosen Glauben
gern anhängen/ und denselben in unsere Kirchen ein-
schieben wolten. Sonsten möchte man Friedens halb
auch etwas mit ihnen umbgehen/ und sie für sich schwär-
men lassen/ so lange/ biss sie desselben müde würden.13

Following a short appendix by Pastor Hoß, in which he agrees with all of the
above, the main questions are re-stated and answered; the points in question
are these:

Für eins/ ob einiger Evangelischer Chur=oder Fürst Ge-
wisseens halben verbunden gewesen/ den Herren Böhmen Bey-
stand zu leisten.

Fürs ander/ ob einiger recht Evangelischer Chur=
or Furst mit gutem Gewissen/ dem Röm. Köyser in jetzi-
gem Krieg Assistentz leisten können und sollen.

Für dritte/ ob ein Christlicher Evangelischer
Chur= oder Furst (zumahl auff ordentlichen Beruff von
seinem Haupt/ deme er mit Pflicht zugethan) mit gutem
Gewissen/ Fug/ Recht unnd Nutz/ lieber Neutral bleiben/
unnd keinen Theil beystehen solle? oder nicht?

In answer to the first question:

Die hüserste Verachtung beyder Römischer Käyser/ die Verwerffung unnd Absenzung Kàysers Ferdinandi/ die Auffwicklung der andern Ihrer Majestät Länders/ die Verbündnung nicht nur mit Christen/ sondern gar mit Türcken und Heyden/ die Cassirung dess Majestät Briefs/ die Erhebung unnd Beförderung der schrecklichen Calvinisteren (absit in juridicto) kann niemand gut heissen/ weder unter den Freunden noch Feinden.¹⁴

In the answer to the assertion that the rebels have acted only out of the purest of motives, namely for the sake of preservation and furtherance of the Gospel, we hear in 1620 an echo of Luther:

...es wäre ein pur luter Religion Werk gewesen/ und hätte unsere Evangélsich Lehr gar allein betroffen/ (welches doch nicht ist) so wäre gleichwohl noch die Frag/ ob man desswegen solche Mittel für die Hand/ unnd bey so beschaffener Sach/ mit solcher Gewalt sich wider die hohe Obrigkeit aufflegen solle?

In Heiliger Schrift wird man keinen einigen Göttlichen Befehl finden/ dass man Gottes Wort gegen die Obrigkeit mit dem Schwert solcher Gestalt verfechten und vertheidigen solle.

Wurde nicht das Jüdische Volck zur Zeit Ahasueri häufstig in der Religion bedränger? Solten sie mit allein wegen des Gottes Dienst unbgeschaffet werden?

All of the above already answers the question: Should the Lutheran Elector and Estates come to the aid of the Emperor? But the theologians made sure that no one would miss the point and dealt with the question directly, adding a number of considerations not included in the above. Thus:


Es schreibt der H. Apostel Johannes: Wer seinen Bruder sehe darben/ und schliesse sein Herz für ihm zu/ bey dene bleibe die Liebe Gottes nicht/ I Joh.3. Wann nun ein Evangelischer Chur= oder Fürst siehert darben/ und Noth leyden/ nicht nur seinen Bruder/ sondern gar sein Haupt/ seinen Käyser/ unnd also gleichsam seinen Vatter: Erschlesusset aber sein Herz für ihm zu/ wil ihme nicht würcklich helfen/ sondern berahet ihm nur/ und spricht/ helf e dir Gott/ so fragt sichs nicht unbillich/ ob in einem solchen die Liebe Gottes nit sparsam gefunden werde?17

A number of historical references to princes and estates follow to attest that in the history of the Reich it has not been unusual to come to the aid of the Emperor. Interestingly enough, the example of the perfidious Maurice of Saxony is included in the noble list.

The author of this address to the Elector was not unaware of the pain and sorrow which might come even to Lutherans, should the Elector do his sworn duty. Nor is the author indifferent to their anguish. Nevertheless, the principle cannot on that account be set aside:

Also kan/ sol und muss niemand die reine Lehr zur Beschön- ung oder Beschützung seines Unfugs/ Ungehorsam/ Auf- ruhers/ Widersetzlichkeit und Halsstarzigkeit missbrauchen. Dann die Evangelische Religion vermag nicht/ dass man von seiner Obrigkeit abfalle/ sich an andere hänge/ und der ordentlichen Obrigkeit widersetzen thus.
Rebels, whether Lutheran or not, must be dealt with as rebels. Indeed, Lutherans, by virtue of their obedience to the Word of God, should not be rebels in the first place.

It may be that some were suggesting that the Lutheran Elector and other princes should be neutral in the struggle. Such a convenient expedient, however, would be -- in the opinion of the theologians -- as bad as rebellion. The very volume of pages devoted to the discussion of neutrality from both a biblical and a historical perspective would suggest that that option had been brought forward and that it had vocal and/or influential champions. We will content ourselves with a few of the summary theological arguments against neutrality:


Im erster Pass/ dass man nicht neutral seyn könne/ wo man selber für sich/ oder die seinen interessiret/ das ist offenbar daher/ weil ein jeder schuldig ist/ seine Wolfart zu bedencken und sich selbst zu lieben. Dann nach der Lieb gegen uns selbst/ sol die Lieb gegen dem Nächsten gerichtet werden/ wie Gottes Wort deutlich sagt und bezeuget. Daher auch diejenigen Ärger als Heyden genennet werden/ die ihrer selbst/ und der ihrigen nicht war nehmen/ I. Tim. 5. Cap.

Im andern Pass/ dass die Neutralität nicht statt habe/ so man einem Theil mit Eyd/ und andern Pflichten zugethan ist/ erscheinet gleicher gestalt auss Gottes Wort und dem Gesetz der Natur offenbarlich.

Betrachtet man nun ChurSachsen absonderlich/ so wäre swar wol derselben zu gönnen/ und häufig zu wünschen/ dass sie Neutral bleiben möchten/ in Erwe-gung aber dero Zustandes/ hat es wol gewiss nicht seyn könen.

Dann was er wil/ dass ihm von den seinen geschehe/
das sol er billich auch andern in dergleichen Fällen
erzeigen unnd beweisen. S. Paulus will von keiner
Neutralität wissen/ gegen die Obrigkeit/ sondern/
treibt starck die Schuldigkeit/ und macht eine
Gewissenssache darauss/ wie weithauffig zu lesen
zum Römern am 13. Cap. Nun ist es um dz Gewissen
ein zartes Ding/ und wird dasselbe ja so wol beschweret/
wann man nicht thut/ das nicht seyn sol. Derwegen
Chur Sachen Gewissens halben/ von ihrem Haupt und
Herrn nicht hat absetzen sollen/ noch können.19

Given the Lutheran doctrine that the papacy is the Antichrist spoken
of by St. Paul in II Thessalonians 2, the theologians were particularly sen-
sitive to the charge that support of the Emperor meant support of the Anti-
christ. In their writings they return again and again, as has already been
noted, to the point that the principle of obedience to authority is clearly
established in the Scriptures, and that it therefore makes no difference who
the ruler is or who is helped by submission to the God-ordained authority.
As ahorent as indirectly aiding the Antichrist was to them, equally ahorent
was a rationalizing tendency which would set aside the Word of God simply be-
cause the consequence of that Word did not suit the one to whom it was addressed.
Indeed, no charge against the Calvinist theologians was more often repeated
than the charge of rationalism, of placing the mind of man above the revealed
mind of God. One cannot but be impressed by the steadfast devotion of the
Lutheran theologians to the primacy of the Word, by their steadfast refusal
to tamper with it, even when such tampering might suit not only human reason
but their own personal safety and the well-being of their flocks. Thus they
deal with the accusation that their position with respect to temporal authority
plays into the hands of the Antichrist:

Zum andern so sprechen etliche/ es hätten die
Evangelischen Reichs-Stände sich wol zu bedencken/ ob
es ihnen für Gott verantwortlich/ und für der Chris-
tenheit rührlich seyn würde/ wann sie sich zu den
Papisten schlagen/ und dess Pabsts Reich stärken
heiffen wolten.
Daruss zu wissen/ dass der Evangelischen Meynung wol nimmermehr dahin gerichtet sey. Dann was die Religion betreffen thut/ so bleiben beyde Theil von einander so weit gesondert/ als sie zuvorn gewesen/ Gleich wie sie aber vorlängst durch einen Religions= und Reichs=Frieden mit einander Politische=weise vereiniget sind/ also können die Evangelischen auch noch zu ihrem Käyser/ wann derselbe zur ungefähr bedränget und geschimpffet wird/ mit gutem Gewissen sich schlagen/ und ihm beystehen/ nickt dem Pabst seyn Reich zu erhalten/ sondern ihrem Käyser und Herrn/ und Länder behülflich zu erscheinen. Und das Könten die Evangelischen ihrem Herrn dem Käyser/ in einer so öffentlich guten und gerechten Sach/ mit gutem Gewissen thun/ wann er gleich gar ein Heyde wäre/ zu geschweigten Catholisch. 20

Running almost parallel to the above cited works addressed to the Elector and to Duke Johann Ernst in Weimar was a series of polemical exchanges between Pastor Hoë in Dresden and certain unnamed Calvinists in Prague. The exchange began when a letter sent by Pastor Hoë to Count Schlick in 1619 was published. The letter apparently was written in response to a request by Count Schlick when he was visiting the Elector in 1619. The Lutheran Count had expressed despair at the prospect of having to live in Bohemia under a Calvinist government, and suggested that he was considering flight to Saxony, if the Calvinists succeeded in taking control of the government. Since Pastor Hoë had lived in Prague and was thoroughly acquainted with the attitudes of the Calvinists there, and since he was the Elector's pastor at the time, it was only natural that his opinion and advice would be sought. After Count Schlick returned to Bohemia, and at his request apparently, Pastor Hoë wrote to him, expanding somewhat on what they had discussed fact to face. Now the letter, which was a private letter, happened to get published, we are not told. But it provoked a storm of protest from the Calvinists, who, by the time the letter was published, were in control in Prague. We will consider this and related correspondence between Prague and Dresden in 1619–20 to demonstrate
two points: 1) It demonstrates that the animus felt by the Elector's most important advisor, Pastor Hoë, was not merely personal and based on his experiences when he lived in Prague; rather his sentiments reflect the consistently orthodox view that the Calvinists' theology was to be dreaded as much as that of the papists and in many instances even more than that of the papists, and that the Calvinists' politics was to be feared far more than the politics of the Catholics; for while the Lutherans had been able to live in relative peace with the Catholics by virtue of the Peace of Augsburg and the Letter of Majesty, all hope of any peace would be destroyed if the Calvinists had their way; though both the Peace of Augsburg and the Letter of Majesty were frequently broken, they at least gave the Lutherans a legal basis for complaint and redress of grievances. Calvinist violence and rebellion would remove that legal barrier to repression, frail as it was, and wash it away in a sea of blood and misery. 2) As well as the above cited literature addressed to the princes, this correspondence reflects for all to see that Lutherans and Calvinists are not simply two sides of the same coin, and cannot fairly be lumped together as a "Protestant" side in a two-sided contest: Catholic-Protestant. Though the Calvinists ever since the time of the Augsburg Confession of 1530 have tried to maintain that illusion for political (not moral or theological) reasons, it is a point which the orthodox Lutherans of every age steadfastly refuse to accept. We repeat yet again: if the behavior of the Lutherans during the Thirty Years' War is going to be understood, it must take into account distinctly Lutheran principles, the Lutheran "Weltanschauung"; to assume that those principles and that "Weltanschauung" was essentially the same in Lutherans as it was in Calvinists can only lead to confusion, to inaccurate and unfair analysis. This correspondence reveals well how vast the fulcrum was which separated the two, and how impossible it was to breach that chasm.
In his letter to Count Schlick, Pastor Höf agrees with Schlick's fears for the future of the Lutheran churches, should the Calvinists gain control. He writes:


Notice the emphasis Höf places here (as he does throughout) on the political consequences of the Calvinist rebellion for the people of the Bohemian crown: not a petty personal grievance, but a very legitimate fear, one perhaps inspired by his own treatment while living in Prague, but nonetheless genuine. Indeed, his fears were all too soon realized, first by the Lutherans at the hands of the Calvinists, and then by the whole land under the heel of the Hapsburgs and the Catholic Reaction. He continues his letter by encouraging Schlick to stay away from revolution and thereby remain faithful to his Lutheran principles:

Also halt ich darfür/ dass Gott der Herr E. G. es zu gutem gethan/ dass sie nicht dieses Thuns sich theilhaftig machen. Der halffe/ dass E. Gn. Ihr Gewissen noch frey behalten/ und nichts darmit participiren. Es sind E. G. in der ganzen Christenheit berühm't/ wegen ihren Eyffers wieder die hochschädliche/ Gots-lästerlich/ und hochverdamlich Calvinische Lehr. E. G. bitt ich per Amoren Dei, & per vulnera Christi, Sie bleiben noch darbe' und thun ein solche Real Demonstration/ dass die ganze Posteritet zu ... Zeiten Euer Gnaden beharzlichen Eyffer zu rühmen Ursach haben mögen. Es haben Euer Gnaden das Papistische Joch nich leyden können. Fürwahr das Calvinische is ja so unerträglich/ und noch view mehr.21

To be sure, those are strong words; stronger ones could not be imagined. But let the reader note, again, that they are not personal in their direction; they are aimed at a doctrine (Lehr) which Höf expects will bring war, ruin and desolation by its consequences. And since that doctrine is, in the first place, contrary to the Word of God, how could the anguished Pastor Höf be expected
to find gentle and kind words for it? His words are those of a man who is angry because the coming disaster could be avoided but will not be, a man who is wrung with frustration that there is nothing he can do about it.

The letter of Pastor Hœ was written at the end of August in 1619. As has already been said, its publication produced shrill denunciation from the Calvinists, first in the form of a preface to the published letter itself, and then in a lengthier document, which left no stone unturned in attacking the motives and character of Pastor Hœ. The denunciation suggested that Lutherans and Calvinists could and would get along very well, if it were not for the likes of Dr. Hœ. Indeed, it pointed to a number of places where the two non-Catholic churches lives in peace, chiefly in the Palatinate. The unsigned Calvinist attack suggested that perhaps Dr. Hœ so hated Calvinists and loved papists because he had received gives from them\textsuperscript{22} -- a point that Gindely and others would later take up as well.

The attack, as might be expected, provoked a spirited defense by a friend of Pastor Hœ, which defense was introduced by the Court chaplain himself. The defense explains the circumstances of the first letter and the right that Pastor Hœ had as a pastor to advise a troubled soul seeking his ministrations. It then goes on to detail the accusations either stated or implied in Dr. Hœ's original letter and to give the basis for the mistrust and fear of Calvinist teaching and political activity. The defense merits our attention both as a reflection of the Lutheran principles at work during this time and because the defense as well as the attack on Pastor Hœ were part of the public "propaganda" (for lack of a better word) at this crucial juncture in the first phase, shortly before the total descent into the War. As propaganda the defense shows us what were the commonly accepted attitudes of the Lutheran lay audience to which it was addressed; if Lutheran orthodoxy was not understood or not
accepted by that audience, it would make little sense to publish a treatise whose purpose is to warn one and all of the dangers to that orthodoxy, that whole Lutheran world view, inherent in Calvinist both theologically and politically. The views expressed, both in their form and content, suggest a high degree of theological literacy and devotion in that lay audience: there is no evidence of a watering down, nor of a talking down to that audience -- the language is almost identical with that employed in the writings of the clergy and the universities addressed to the princes. The point is simply this: the writer has reason to assume that the citizens of Saxony are Lutheran by conviction, and that they too will be shocked and appalled at the prospect of Calvinism's triumph, just as they would be at the total triumph of the Catholic Reaction -- they do not and do not want to see themselves as religious cousins of either; they were Lutherans, not "Protestants" in the commonly accepted sense of the word. The following excerpts are typical of the whole.

The faithful are reminded that the current position of the church in Saxony relative to obedience to secular authority is nothing else than what Luther has said:

Es erinnert sich auch Herr Doctor Hoe/ der Wort Herrn D. Lutheri seligen/ der Tom. 6. Ien. Es gebühre sich nach der Schrift keines wegs wieder die Obrigkeit zu setzen/ Gott gebe sie thue recht oder unrecht sol.\(^{23}\)

The propaganda from Prague had asserted that in the Palatine Lutherans and Calvinists had no difficulty in getting along together and working together. That cooperation however was accomplished only by force. For the Lutherans to expect anything but persecution from Calvinist government runs contrary to the experience of the Lutherans under Calvinist governments. The writer cites specific instances, but we will content ourselves with this summary statement:

Es ist ihm bekannt die Calvinische weise/ wie es die Calvinischen Theologi, und zum theil Theologi-sirende eyferige/ oder wütende Politici, mit den
Evangelischen zumaehen pflegen/ wann sie dan brachiu
seculare zu ihrem favor haben.
Grosse Potentaten und Herrn/ wann sie gleich fur
sich fromm und mild seyn/ wann sie gleich niemanden
begehren in Gewissens sachen zu türbieren, müslen
doch ihren hohen Namen/ zu allerley Anordnungen brau-
chen/ oder missbrauchen lassen.
Da gehet es durch Practicirung der Calvinische
Werckzeuge hernach über die Lutheraner.
Da darß man wol an die Churfürstliche Gemach
schreiben:
O Casimire potens, fervos expelle Lutheri,
Ense, rota, ponto, funibus, igne, neca.
Das ist/ es sol sich der Herr Pfaltzgrauff
lassen angelegen seyn/ die Lutherischen ausszujagen/
sie mit Schwert/ mit Rad/ mit Wasser/ Mit Feur/
mit Strick zuverfolgen. Ach es hats ja leyder die
Erfahrung gegeben/ wie en den Lutherischen Christen
gegangen/ wo die Calvinisten überhand bekommen.24

The Calvinist "Passquillant" (i.e., the attack on Dr. Hoß) had severly
criticized the Court chaplain for maintaining that life under the Calvinists
was a hard yoke to bear. In a lengthy and eloquent section the chaplain's
defender demonstrates the truth of Dr. Hoß's assertion:

Zum dreyssigsten/ eyffert der Passquillant
sehr hierüber/ dass das Calvinische Joch ja so
unerträglich/ und noch wol unerträglicher genennet
worden als das Büspliche. Nun ist es mit gewisser
Bedingung geschehen/ wann nemlich der Calvinische
Geist überhand bekomme.
Der Passquillant und Ehrensänder schreibt/
es sey dieses fürgeben D. Hoe/ ein pur lauters Fabel/
und werde den Leuten eine vergebliche Furche und
Grauen gemacht/ da nichts dahinter sey/ begehret auch
unerträgliche Calvinische Joch sey.
Damit nun der Christliche Leser/ eine wenige
Nachrichtung hiervon habe/ so ist unverborgen.
Erstlichen/ wie grausam und erschrecklich der
Lutherischen Lehr und ihre Lehrer/ ja auch ihr
Christus selbst geschändet/ und gelästert worden/
und das muss man von denen Calvinisten/ wo sie
überhand nehmen/ leiden.
Man muss hören/ dass sie die Lutheraner öffent-
llich ausruffen für Capernaiten/ Fleischfresser/
Blutsäufer [all references to the Lutheran doctrine
of the Real Presence of Christ in the Sacrament] Sabel-
lianer/ ... Arrianer/ Nestorianer/ Eutychianer/ Seel-
mörderische Verführer/ Landbetrüger/ Götzendiener und
dergleichen.
Ist das nicht ein hartes/ und schweres Joch?
Von den Calvinisten muss man leiden/ dass sie uns
tumessen/ wir Lutherische glaubten keinen einigen Ar-
tikel dess Apostolischen Glaubens/ wie zusehen in der
Missiv, so D. Pezelius an L. Hämelmnnun abgeben lassen.
Ist das nicht ein schweres Joch.
Von den Calvinisten muss man leiden/ dass sie
unsere Lutherische Lehr anpfülen und sprechen: Pfui
auss mit dieser garstigen schändlichen Theologia,
(Sturmius in seiner Erinnerungs=Schrift pag. 37) ist
das nicht ein schweres Joch? Sie geben für/ wir Luth-
erische seyn nicht Schaaffee der Weyde Christi (Pezelius,
in vorverwehnter Schand=missiv, pag. 85.)
Von den Calvinisten muss man leiden/ dass sie un-
sern Christum einem groben Esel verglichen/ ru-fen ihn
auss/ für einen reissenden Wolff/ für einen Seelmörder/
für einen Hirngötzen/ für einen ohnmächtigen Baal/ wie
in dess Priesters zu Runckel Suedo=Christo, pag. 105.
159. 165. 178. und in der Vorred/ nach der Länge zu
sehen. Ist das nicht ein schweres Joch?
Von den Calvinisten muss man leiden/ wir Luther-
aner würden ewig verloren seyn/ weil wir das wahren
und ewigen Gottes verfühlen thätent/ wie Georg Hansefeld/
in seinem Wegweiser schreibt/ fol. 411. und 2. mal
pfus/ pfui/ darüber aussuffett. Ist das nicht ein
schweres Joch? Dergleichen unzehlich viel grausame
Gotteslästernungen und Schmähungen/ könte man einführen/
die alle von den Calvinischen Priestern und Deforma-
torn über unsere Evangell-Lehr/ und über unsern Christum
selbst ausgeschütetet werden. Noch soll das Calvinische
Joch nicht unträglich seyn.
Wo die Calvinisten überhand haben/ da müssen die
Lutheraner bald weichen. Also wurden nach dess Christ-
lichsten Churfürsten Ludwigs seiligen Tod/ auff anstiff-
ten der Calvinischen Lehrer/ die Lutherischen Theologi
zu Heidelberg/ ihrer Aempter entsetzet/ und zum Lande
hinauss getreiben/ ob schon viel hundert Personen
sehnlich darfür gebäten hatten/ Anno 1584. Wer weit-
läufftigen Bericht hiervon haben wil/ der lese n ur der
Pfälzischen Exulanten/ warhaftigten und gründlichen
Bericht/ sonderlichen pag. 99. 350. 361. da wird man
befinden/ wie der Calvinische Geist/ mit den Lutheranern
umgehe. In Holland haben die unruhigen Calvinischen
Prediger auch hefftig wider die Lutheraner/ oder Marti-
isten/ wie sie genennet werden/ gewütet. Das hat gethan
Licentiat Henrich Boekshorn/ zu Worden/ das that Petrus
Flanclius zu Ambsterdamb/ die hielten mit Gewalt an/ dass
man die Lutheraner ganz aus dem Lande jagen/ und aus-
mustern solte.25

Es mögen auch die wahren Evangellischen Christen
beherzigen/ wann D. Paraeus, und seines gleichen ein-
nisteln/ und die Oberhand bekommen/ was wegen unserer

Das sind dess Heydelbergischen Professoris, der Calvinisten Abgotts eigne Wort.


Unlike the persecution of the Lutherans by the Calvinists cited above, Dr. Hös’s defender points out that in Lutheran Saxony the Calvinists were not persecuted but left to practice their religion freely. Again, the principles governing the secular sword and the church are seen as poles apart: in Lutheranism only the Gospel can convert, and therefore, as we have noted before, the use of the sword can only be an aberration; but in the Calvinist theocracy its use would be the norm:

Noch heutiges Tages/ hat Chur=Sachsen solche Land= sassen vom Adel/ die Calvinischer Religion zugethan sind/ sie werden aber nicht allein geduldet/ sondern auch wol zu den ansehnlichsten Zusammenkünften be= schreiben und erfordert/ es wird ihnen all Gnad und Ehre/ von der Herrschaft/ und dem ganzen Hoff erzei= get. Was sagt der Passquillant darzu?

But where men break their oath of obedience and refuse to do their duty, imprisonment is not persecution but the well-deserved consequence of rebellion:

Die Gefängniss und Revers derer Jenigen/ die wider Eyd und Pflicht gehandelt/ die im Land Unruh gesti= ftet/ die ihrer Herrschaft Verbott freventlich übertreten/ sind kein Joch/ sondern eine wolverdien= te und allzu gelinde Straff gewesen. Es hätten etliche so viel wol verdientet/ dass man ihnen was anders zu Lohn gegeben hätte.27
Though most of this work is devoted to a defense of a Lutheran pastor and the Lutheran position, Dr. Höe's defender also includes in his defense a call to all loyal Saxons to rally to the support of their Lutheran Elector. But notice the purpose of that support: it is not so that the Elector can crush heretics in behalf of the Lutheran pure Gospel; rather, in keeping with the principles of Lutheran orthodoxy, it is so that the Elector can do his duty to the Empire and to his own subjects by protecting the integrity of the constitution and his own lands from civil disorder. While the panegyric to the Elector is a bit long and overdone, as patriotic calls to support the flag usually are, it always stops short of hoping for the use of the sword against heretics because they are heretics — let the reader compare that with the calls for crusades, be they against infidels or "Protestants" from the Catholic camp, and the equally shrill cries of the Genevan theocracy for the city of God, free from the taint of dissent through the use of the blood-stained sword. We cite but a small part of the Lutheran rallying cry to the support of the Elector:


Sie sehen scharff wie ein Adler/ sie sehen über sich/ zu Gott/ sie sehen neben sich/ auff ihren Keyser und Herrn/ dem sie gehuldet und geschworen/ dem sie Christi Befehl nach/ das seine zu geben/ und nicht zu nehmen begehren.

Sie sehen vor sich/ auff die heilsamen Reichsverfassungen/ auff die loblichen Ordnungen/ auff Erbarkeit/ und Redlichkeit.

Sie sehen zurücke/ auff die Exempla ihrer hochgeehrten Herrn Vorführen/ wie dieselben in den ordentlichen Schranken/ fest und unverrückt verblieben.

Duty, honor, obedience, consistency, the tradition of the Lutheran lands, these are the ornaments in the crown of the Lutheran Elector — not the promise of a radical fanatic for a heaven on earth through disobedience, rebellion and the sword raised against all who march to the beat of the different drummer!
Then, as the defense draws to a close, and lest anyone miss the point, the distinction between the Lutheran and Calvinist behavior in church and state relations is once again finely drawn; in its light no one should make the mistake of calling a Lutheran a moderate Calvinist or a left-wing Catholic: a Lutheran is a Lutheran, and his world view has no more in common with the one than with the other:


Gleich wie nun die Evang. Theologi ins gemein kein Blutbad über die Calvinisten practiciret, also kann auch über Herrn D. Hoe/ weder mit Schrifften/ noch mit andern Zeugnissen bewiesen werden/ dass er in dem Schreiben/ an den HerrnGraffen/ oder in andere Weg dergleichen sich bemüht habe. Denn/ das ist nicht der Modus, irrige Lehr auss dem Wege zu reumen/ wenn wider die Lehrer oder Bekenner derselben/ mit leiblichen Waffen gestritten/ oder einem und dem andern nach dem Leben getrachtet wird. 29

The fears expressed by the Lutheran pastors and theologians, fears of persecution in Bohemia, should the Calvinists win control of the government, were confirmed by a complaint published by the Lutherans in Bohemia and addressed to their Lutheran co-religionists in Germany in February of 1620. Their lament
includes the warning that if the Calvinist rebellion succeeds, it is just a
matter of time until the disorder, destruction, and persecution spill over into
the Lutheran lands in Germany:

Dann/ wan dieses Meer von den Calvinianischen Wind-
würbeln also zur Ungestümigkeit aufgearbeit/ und wird
verschlucket/ und wider das Böhôm. Gebirg aussegewütet
haben/ wird es anfangen un überlaufen/ euern Städte
mit grossem Sturm zuflissen/ und euere Aechter mit zu
vieler überschwâmmung ganz verderben. 36

The Lutherans protest that they are not rebels, a point which the Elector will
use in their defense after the battle of White Mountain:

Wir protestier auch von ganzem Herzen/ und mit
öffentlicher Stimm/ dass wir nichts wider Königl. M.
un die löbl. Stände begehren zu handen/ viel weniger
vorhabens/ die Durchleuchtige Fürsten/ un hochberühm-
te Gemeinde der Augustusburgische Confession im geringsten
mit unsern Trübsaln und Weheklagen zu erzünden: sintentahl
unser Klaggeschrey einig und allein ergehet/ wider die
schädliche Füchls/ die den Weingarten dess Herrn Zeboaths
verwüsten/ wider die Brandfuchls/ wider die Calvinische
Füchls/ die da zugleich bey Hof/ und auff den Canzeln
lauter Fäurflamen ausswerffen.

Diese Fuchls haben nun die Ständt und Fürsten
mit bösem Betrug arglistig hindergangen/ halten sie
noch also betrogen in ihren Klauen/ und rühmen sich/
dass sie die Lutheraner/ mit dem Geld/ so die Luth-
erarer auch selbst erlegen/ unters Joch und in ihren
Gehorsam zwingen und treiben.

Thus they protest that they are now worse off than they had been under
Catholic rule:

Anfânglich haben sich sonderliche griff mercken lassen/
mit welchen sie in kurzer Zeit/ nit allein unsere Kirch-
en zuvertilgen gedencken/ sondern auch vertilge. Diss
thun sie mit grosser sorg un fleiss/ damit sie den
Weitlichen gewalt gegen uns wehrlosen und schwachen
mögen strecken. Dannenhero ist der König ein Calvinist/
wie auch sein Brüder und die Grafen von Anhalt/ und
Mayfesselt. Der Graf von Thurn trägt auf beyden Achseln/
gute Freund. Andere habe weder Gott noch Glaube/ welche
werden aber sonderlich zu grossen Emptern und Digni-
tätten erhaben? Freylich ja die Calvinisten. 31

Wir hatten grosse Freyheit/ und waren sicher und
mächtig/ dass sich auch die Keyser Rudolph/ Matthias/

(The "Lutherische Mitbrüder" referred to above are apparently those in Germany who had helped the Calvinists and/or were slow in coming to the side of lawful authority in the present unhappy circumstance.)

Vielen haben sie eingeäbild/ dass sie mit willens/ die Lutherische zu vertilen/ sondern allein/ was von dem Papistischen Sauerteig übrig/ ausszufegen. Unter diesem Schein stellen sie alle Laster an/ und entschuldigten solche Thaten hiemit/ beheren auch/ wir sollen solche Werck lobè und gut heissen. Also haben sie neuliche in der abscheulichen Bildstürmerey Christi unsers Seligmachers Bildnüssen angefaetet/ herunter gerissen/ ün verbrent/ da sie doch ihren eignen Fürsten und Herrn Bildnüssen aufrichten/ ja auch am Halss tragen.32

They appeal to the Lutherans in Germany to stop sending support to the Calvinists (such as were so engaged) and to unite with the Saxon Lutherans in recognizing the danger and the evil, and so do what they can to help them.

Lasset dann die stim des billichen Schmerzens herfür brechen/ die entweder sich mit Frucht und Nutzbarkeit in die Lufft schwingen wird/ oder aber mit einer Gefahr uns wider zufliehen. In uns Lutheranern selbstesten hangen und ligien die Ursachen solches vielfaltigen Ubels/ dessen sich auch die Calvinisten rühmen/ und uns spöttlich vorwerffen. Dann ihr sott wissen/ allerliebstest Mitbrüder/ dass die Calvinischen Landen viel auch die verständigte allbereit bered habe/ und allen allenthalben starck einbilden/ dass es die Lutherischen im R. Reich/ und ganz Teutschland mit ihnen halten/ ün einig seyen in Glaubenssachen/ Item/ dass Münningen und Ulm ihren Geldaetsch ausspenden/ zu Verthiddigung dess Calvinischen Glaubens/ Item/ dass die Academy zu Tübingen/ und die Lutherische Aebt in ihren Kirchen für unsern König/ als rechtme-ssig erwethen betten/ und jederzeit dahin gefiessen seye/ damit allenthalben Geld zugeschaffen werde und
und erzählen also neue und wunderer Ding/ so andere sollen gered haben/ mit welchen sie jederman weiss machen wollen/ dass alle Teutschen unser Kôngs und der Calvinischen Glauben zugethan seyen/ den Churfürsten auss Sachsen allein ausgenommen/ der sehr verbittert und hock erzürnt sey/ dass er die Chron in Böhmen mit Überkommen habe. Das ist eben auch/ was neulich Doctori Hoe vorgeworffen worden: dass die ganze Welt nun Calvinistisch werde. Kein Ding ist/ welches dem gemeinen Pübel mehr ans Herz greifft und bewegt. 33

Weiters so haben nun diese von Gott verfluchte Schlingen irhen fromen König beredt/ der Himmel werde an allen Orten/ auch in allen winceln glich regnen/ wann er allein die halb Papistische und halb Lutherische Abgüterey ausserute/ und die Kirchen in seinem Königreich von dem Lutherischen Abendmal/ das ist/ dess Teuffels auffgeworffenen Koth aussfege und reinige. Was haben wir derhalben anderst zu gewarten/ als das nach einer solchen mit Betrug und Gewalt angewickelter Verfolgung/ ein grosse Tyranney und Barbarische Grausamkeit erfolge/ dessgleichen bey Menschen gedenken nie gewesen/ nock seyn wird. 34

All of the above, from pastors and theologians, from laymen and propagandists, from Lutherans inside of Saxony and outside of it, should make it abundantly clear, that to judge Lutheran behavior during the Thirty Years' War with the pre-conceived notion that Lutherans were under some sort of religious or moral obligation to take the side of the Calvinists is to fail totally to understand how the Lutherans themselves viewed their situation as the War began. The Calvinist notions of using force to compel uniformity, force to rebel against legal authority, were utterly repugnant to the Lutherans. Calvinist ridicule of the doctrine of the Real Presence, violence against statues and pictures of Christ, denial of the union of the two natures in Christ from His conception, the Calvinist doctrine of absolute predestination, its consequent denial of the doctrine of grace, the notion that God willed the Fall and the eternal damnation of those who perish, all these were also well known to the orthodox Lutherans and filled them with dread of falling
under a violent and radical Calvinist regime. To tell a good Lutheran of the seventeenth century that he was duty bound to spring to the defense of such heretics and even join them in revolution would surely have brought a look of shock and dismay to his face.

It is from this sort of context that the actions of John George in the spring of 1620 must be considered. All of the above cited works had occupied his considerable attention; the opinions of his theologians and his pastor certainly were no surprise to him; the reported behavior of the rebels in Bohemia -- bad enough by itself -- and their persecution of Lutherans could only confirm in him a resolve to support the Emperor.

Already in January, 1620, the Elector began to move; he sent his ally, Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt, to meet with members of the Catholic League as well as with representatives of the Lower and Upper Saxon Circles, to prepare the ground for an alliance of Lutherans and Catholics against the rebels of Bohemia. To be sure, the Elector tried to get something in return for his support of the Emperor and the League. But what he sought was altogether in accord with established custom and with the constitution. He wanted the assurance of both the League and the Emperor that once the Catholics were victorious in Bohemia they would not use their restored power to further persecute and harass the Lutherans; to settle the fears of the Upper and Lower Saxon Circles, he wanted the promise that they would not be disturbed in their possession of the ecclesiastical estates that had fallen to them since 1555 -- a promise which the Hapsburgs at least had implied many times, certainly by their acceptance of the status quo; and in pledge that he would be paid for his expenses in fighting the Emperor's battles, he wanted Upper and Lower Lusatia, and ultimately a German principality that might fall vacant through the use of the Imperial ban against rebels. These requests were neither unreasonable nor particularly
greedy. Quite to the contrary, they were designed to uphold the constitution, achieve unity and stability within the Empire, and assure peace for the future. The requests or conditions are altogether in accord with the Elector's Lutheran principles. They are devoid of any bloodthirsty expectations of revenge against the persecutors of Lutherans, be they Catholic or Calvinist, and they certainly do not envision any violent wrenching of princes or peasants from their perviously held convictions. Compare that to the labors of Maximilian in Austria, Bavaria, and the Palatinate; compare it with the behavior of Ferdinand once he regained possession of Bohemia; compare it with the Calvinist excesses in Bohemia and elsewhere when they had power.

In March the negotiations between John George I of Saxony, Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt, Maximilian of Bavaria and his allies in the League, and the Emperor himself were concluded, and the alliance was struck. The Lutherans of the Upper and Lower Saxon Circles were promised that force would not be used to expel them from their possessions so long as they did not rebel. By the end of April the warrants were received from the Emperor, assuring the Elector that he had no intentions of persecuting the Lutherans, once he was re-established in Bohemia, and authorizing the Elector to invade Silesia and Lusatia.

The record of the Saxon invasion and war in Silesia and Lusatia is a picture of peace more than one of battle and bloodshed. Before he invaded, the Elector sent representatives to the Estates to urge their submission. Whether estates submitted or required seige, as soon as his forces occupied the lands, the Elector granted peace on the mildest of terms: religious and political liberties were assured status quo ante bellum, and pecuniary fines were levied against only those who lead resistance. All of this mightily annoyed Ferdinand, who by this time scented blood and wanted a bloody satisfaction.
But John George steadfastly refused, and in turn he urged Ferdinand to be
mild; if for no other reason, resentment and future rebellion might thereby be
prevented. The subjection of Lusatia and Silesia begin in September of 1620
and was completed by the end of February, 1621.

Unfortunately, the pacific attitude and lenient treatment practiced by
John George was not to be expected from either Maximilian or Ferdinand. While
the Lutheran Elector's policy was aimed at limiting the War, the schemes
and dreams of Maximilian together with plots and intrigues of the Emperor
assured its expansion. John George was apparently unaware of the wide
ranging series of private arrangements that had been made between the Emperor,
Maximilian, and the Spanish Hapsburgs. As early as 1619 the Emperor had
agreed to the invasion of the Palatine by Spanish forces -- a clear viola-
tion of the traditional Wahlcapitulation. He had secretly agreed to grant
the Electoral dignity of Frederick, together with his lands, after imposition
of the ban, to Maximilian -- also a violation of the constitutional Wahl-
capitulation. But most importantly, he apparently had not the least intention
of honoring his promises to restore the liberties granted in the Letter of
Majesty, once he regained power in Bohemia. For once the Battle of White
Mountain sealed the doom of the Calvinist rebels, in Prague, the forces of
the Catholic Reaction were swift to mount a bloody purge of all non-Catholic
churches throughout Bohemia.

It is beyond the scope of this work to deal with all of these sorry deeds
in any detail. But as we have contrasted the Lutheran mind set with that of
the Calvinists, so now, at least in summary fashion, we need to contrast it
with that of the Catholic Reaction. The contrast is most striking in Bohemia
from the fall of the Calvinists at White Mountain in 1620, through 1622,
by which time the Catholic Reaction had finished its work in the troubled kingdom.
The collapse of the Bohemian rebels was total and the subsequent ruination of the country complete. The Emperor worked his will through the army of Maximilian and to a lessor extent through that of the Elector of Saxony, and then directly with his own army and agents. The lands of Calvinists and Lutherans alike were forfeit to the crown, and sold to Catholic foreigners for a song to pay the Emperor's war debts. When the sum proved insufficient, the currency was debased to the same end, bringing ruin to those landed and landless whose ruin had not been accomplished by the war or the previously imposed penalties. Urged on by his Jesuit advisors (if he needed any urging), Ferdinand began his destruction of the Calvinist, the various Hussite (Utraquists, Brethren and the like) and Lutheran churches. These last were spared only temporarily in deference to John George; but their freedom was as doomed as that of the rebels from the start. Their political leader, whose moderation was legend, who had labored long to prevent open rebellion, was among the first to be executed. Count Andreas Schlick had not fled as had the bold and brave Calvinist leaders, Count Thurn and Frederick himself. His execution may have been a relief for him, relieving him as it did of a struggle with radicals and reactionaries for which he had no taste. But nevertheless it marks a sad chapter in the annals of Lutheran loyalty to the principles of obedience to the State; for Saxon troops were used to keep order in Prague on the day of his hanging! Even if John George had know about it, he probably could have done nothing to prevent this cruel irony. When he found out about the death of his friend and co-religionist, he should have put his head in his hands, and perhaps he did. Maximilian hypocritically sent a message to Ferdinand, urging him not to go to excess in purging the land of heretics, and quickly followed it up with another message telling him to ignore the first. In spring of 1621 all non-Catholic clergy, teachers, and university professors, except for a handful of Lutherans,
were expelled from the country and the adherents of their churches were forbidden the public exercise of their religious rites. In 1622 the Emperor's control was such that he longer needed to concern himself with his promises to guarantee the rights of the Lutherans, and their clergy too were expelled and their worship services prohibited. Nor were the severe restrictions lessened as the lands became quiet. In fact, the Catholic reaction knew only how to tighten its grip: in the years following the subjection of all Estates, between 1622 and 1626, conversions to Catholicism were forced through the removal of all civil as well as religious rights from non-Catholics, the billeting of troops on the little property left to them, the allowance of emigration only after the forfeiture of the emigrants property (or at least a considerable portion of it). 39

These tragedies were not inflicted without the vigorous protests of John George. On October 10, 1622, for example, he addressed a letter to Liechtenstein, asking him for the sake of peace to respect the liberties promised by the emperors, which promises, of course, had been confirmed by Ferdinand. His plea was based not only on promises which he had expected would be kept, but as well on good sense:

So haben wir doch aus tragender Sorgfältigkeit, u. dass wir genugsam berichtet worden, dass Schutzes u. geneigten Willens, ..., sie wollen ihro, wie bisshero, also auch forthin, gedachte Evangelische Gemeinden in allen Treuen lassen befohlen seyn, u. da etwas an dem aussgesprengten Geschrei wegen Sperrung der Evangelischen Kirchen u. Entziehung des Exercitii Religionis seyn sollte, nicht allein die Fortstellung desselben mit allem Fleiss an gehörigen Orten verhindern, u. dadurch neue Empörungen, Unruhe, Widewärtigkeit u. Weitläufigkeiten, welche gar leichtlich daraus entstehen können, sondern uns auch, ... freundlich berichten, damit wir wegen unsers hohen darbey versirenden Intresse, dasjenige in Acht nehmen u. befürdern mögen, was zu Abnehmung alles Unheyls, u. Erhaltung friedlichen und ruhigen Wesens nützlichen u. dienstlichen. 40

On October 29, he addressed a similar and sharper appeal to Ferdinand himself.

In it he laments that his letter to Liechtenstein appears to him to have had the
opposite effect of his intent: instead of lifting the persecution of the 
Lutherans, Liechtenstein had increased it, driving them out of Prague and all 
Bohemia and depriving them of all their guaranteed rights:

...und also genug zu verstehen geben worden, wie wenig 
an meiner treuen, wohlgemeinten Erinnerung guter Nach-
barschaft auch ruhigem u. friedlichem Wesen gelegen.

He warns the Emperor that continuation of these altogether illegal proce-
dures can only lead to renewed hostilities, and that after he (the Elector) 
had risked so much personally out of devotion to the Emperor and to peace. 
He even makes the very Lutheran point that religion per se should not be 
persecuted, and especially not in the case of the Bohemian rebellion, since 
it was launched for political reasons more than for religious ones. And in 
any case, the Lutherans had not been guilty of rebellion, except where they 
had been forced to participate in it; in such cases they acted no differently 
than many Catholics, who also had been compelled to acquiesce in acts of 
rebellion. (He could have added that at its political beginnings, the Catholic 
Bohemian Estates were at least as involved in the rebellion as the Lutherans: 
only after it took on its distinctively Calvinist cast were they alienated 
from it.) The Elector then asks the Emperor to keep his promise, and encloses 
the Emperor's letter of promise just in case he had forgotten about it. John 
George points out that he had not undertaken the defense of the Emperor's 
legitimate claims in order to see Lutherans crushed as payment for his aid. 
The letter closes with the plea that the Emperor will cease the persecution, 
allow the churches to re-open, and so win the joy and gratitude of thousands 
of souls, who will thank him with their continued obedience. 41

Pastor Höe also pleaded for the Lutherans to Count Liechtenstein in 
a letter dated Nov. 27, 1622, after the Lutheran pastor had been expelled 
from Prague. He reminds the Count that his Elector had been a true and faithful
supported to the Emperor, but that now his patience and loyalty were being severely tried by these illegal proscriptions of the Lutherans. He even goes on to quote the assurances given by the ecclesiastical Elector of Cologne at the Mühlhausen meeting in 1620 (at which the alliance between the League and the Saxons had been forged); he quoted the Cologne Elector, who, by the way, was the appointee of Maximilian and his faithful follower:

Dann wir Catholischen, lieben u. halten euch der alten Augspurgischen Confession zugethan, andere nicht als unser selbsten eygen Fleisch u. Blut.

He continues:


The Court chaplain then repeats the assurances of the Elector's earlier letter that the Lutheran subjects are innocent, and that a pardon of those forced into positions of insurrection will be repaid by grateful service. He concludes:

Hierumb bitte E. Fürstl. Gn. ich nachmahn durch die Barmherzigkeit Gottes, u. durch die Blutstropfende Wunden Jesu Christi, u. bezeuge es mit Gott,

But these appeals to common sense, to the duty and honor of fulfilling one's promises, to the trustworthy assurances of future loyalty and service, fell on deaf ears. Just as so many, past and present, Catholic and Calvinist, have judged the Lutherans by standards foreign to Lutherans, so now the Lutheran Elector and Court chaplain judged the Emperor and his minions by a standard foreign to them. The extirpation of heresy was the one right and the one truth to the Catholic Reaction, and anything -- sworn promises, legal obligations, ethical behavior -- which interfered with that one truth was wrong and evil. After all, had not the popes declared repeatedly that promises to heretics were null and void, and the keeping of such a mortal sin (e.g. the safe conduct promised to Huss, the promises made at the Peace of Augsburg; and later the provisions of the Peace of Prague of 1635 and the Peace of Westphalia itself would experience a similar denunciation from Rome)?

Thus Ferdinand II answered the letter of the Lutheran Elector on January 25, 1623. In his answer Ferdinand gives his own interpretation of the rebellion: he was the lawful king, had promised to uphold the Bohemian rights, and then for no reason at all they rebelled. Now that the rebellion was put down, he is convinced that the restoration of the rights granted in the Letter of Majesty would only be used as:
... eben Mittel u. Gelegenheit, zu vorigen Unwesen in Händen verblieben, u. Wir ... einige Hoffnung eines sichern u. beständigen Friedens nicht haben, sondern dass unter diesem Schein dess Majestät=Briefs Unsern Feinden, ihre Calvinische, Blutdürstige, gefährliche Anschläge, zu Veränderung aller Polizey, ja dass Religion=Frieden selbst wiederumb uaff die Bahn zu bringen nur mehere Ursachen gegeben würden.

He goes on to assert that the loss of their privileges was their own fault, because they revolted and then showed disrespect after the revolt. He accuses the Lutherans of being just as bad as all the others, joining quickly in revolt and using their churches to foment rebellion to his harm and that of his House, which facts, he asserts are well known to everyone. What treachery, what hypocrisy! Had these "facts" been known to everyone, they would have been known also to the Emperor before he ever made his promises to the Elector; for the revolt had only defections after those promises had been made. To add insult to injury, Ferdinand closes the letter by expressing the hope that all these temporary difficulties would not disturb their friendship and affection for one another. ¹³

John George made yet another futile attempt to change the Emperor's perfidious course in a letter that breathes frustration. He wrote on January 28, 1623, again pleading with Ferdinand to show mercy and grace and so bind the nation to himself; once more he warns that the path being pursued can only bring still greater ruin both to the Empire and to the hereditary lands of the Hapsburg House. ¹⁴ This letter had, of course, no greater impact than the previous one.

As busy as the Emperor was in breaking honorable, peace-inducing promises, just so busy he was in keeping dishonorable, war-provoking ones. Already on September 21, 1621, Ferdinand had executed a document promising the Electorate of Palatine to Maximilian with the proviso that Ferdinand should be the one to decide when to make the promise public and effective. At the same time,
he was seeking advice from the League and Saxony, as though he still did not
know what to do about Frederick's German possessions and Electoral dignity.
Despite the reservations of the ecclesiastical Electors of Trier (a non-
entity in the employ of the French) and Mainz, and the feeble and perhaps con-
fused or not altogether sincere opposition of Saxony, the Emperor kept his
promise at a meeting of the leading princes of the Empire in Regensburg in
1623. Along with the Electoral dignity, Maximilian received the rights to the
Upper Palatine, while the Spanish remained in possession of the Lower Palatine.
Frederick, already under the Imperial ban since January 1621, had none to
effectively plead his case or for the rights of his children; for the
Protestant Union had fearfully dissolved shortly after the issuance of the ban.

To be sure, the Calvinists protested all of these violations of the
constitution and this reckless disregard of the Wahlcapitulation. But
morally and legally they were in no position to paint Ferdinand as the law-
breaker. For they had been the first to violate both the constitution and
their oath of allegiance to the Emperor, when they at first openly and then
secretly supported his revolt, or at the very least failed to assist in its
suppression. Calvinist radicalism was now fully joined by Catholic reaction
in making a shambles on the constitution and the German liberties, and in an
unprecedented fashion demonstrating that, as mentioned before, when it came
to the German constitution: Macht macht Recht. Lutheran moderation at Regens-
burg was too dispirited by the treachery and bloodshed in Bohemia to put forth
any reasonable, much less constitutional alternatives to the course determined
by the Emperor, Maximilian, and his brother, the Elector of Cologne. The just
cited exchange of letters between the Elector and Ferdinand had, in any event,
made it clear that no one in power was interested in Lutheran moderation anyway.
All balance in the Empire was swept away at Regensburg: the Electoral College
was now Catholic by the wide margin of 5-2; the promises to the Lutherans for Bohemia were already dust, and the promises for the security and stability of the Lutherans in Germany appeared ready to turn to ashes, as the Catholics openly spoke at Regensburg of the triumph of Catholicism in the near future, and kept alive the League's army after the disbanding of the Union and its army. The once loud and threatening Calvinist radicals had been silenced. As they had supported revolt contrary to the constitution, so the Emperor contrary to the constitution had advised them through Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt that they too would be subject to the ban, if they moved to support Frederick, even financially. The threat had its desired effect, and by April of 1621, the Union had disbanded. Thus their protests in 1623 had no more effect on Ferdinand and Maximilian than had those of John George.

From 1622 to 1629 Saxony and the principles of Lutheran moderation made very little difference to the course of events in the Empire. With the army of the League under Tilly and in the pay of Maximilian, and with the army of Wallenstein spilling all over Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Bohemia, and parts of Saxony in the service of Ferdinand there was no further need for the grasping Maximilian or the treacherous Ferdinand to consult with John George or take his principles and scruples into account in their policy. Nor had the Calvinists any desire to listen to the Lutheran Elector saying: I warned you! Both Lutherans and Calvinists could protest all they wanted in these dark years. It changed nothing. With the fall of Heidelberg and the Palatine in 1622, Catholic Reaction set in with a vengeance. First the Calvinists were eliminated and then the Lutherans -- again in clear violation of all law. Secretly assured by Ferdinand that his promise to pass the Electorate on to Frederick's descendents at Maximilian's death meant nothing, Maximilian confidently employed his faithful Jesuits in turning the Palatine into
Bavaria II. At the same time, the bishop of Speier, president of the Reichskammergericht, began a retaliatory reformation of those ecclesiastical estates which had fallen to him from the Palatine tree (1623–b).

To make matters worse, Christian IV of Denmark thought he saw an opportunity to take advantage of the divisions in the Empire to establish himself in the northern bishoprics and estates of the Lower Saxon Circle. The pretense that he was coming to the aid of his Lutheran brothers in Germany and acting in the interests of the restoration of Frederick in the Palatine fooled no one. Nor could it have fooled anyone: the Lutherans of the Lower Saxon Circle made it clear that they did not want his help. The Lutheran head of the Lower Saxon Circle, Duke Christian of Brunswick-Lüneburg was unwilling to make war on the Emperor. But between 1623 and 1625, Christian IV played on the growing fears of many of the northern estates, fears that the Catholic Reaction would succeed in seizing their ecclesiastical estates, long since become Lutheran or Calvinist, and forcibly return them to the Catholic fold. In May of 1625, with an army that could not possibly succeed (some 20,000 at most), without the support of many of the Lower Saxon Estates, with the antipathy of most Lutherans to foreign intervention, Christian IV invaded the Circle. Once again Lutheran moderation and Lutheran principles went up in smoke, as Maximilian with the Emperor's blessing, unleashed Tilly's army to advance "in the name of God and His Holy Mother." Once again and in vain John George called for moderation. In October of 1625, he tried to arrange a truce; but with the armies of Wallenstein and Tilly insisting that no truce was possible until the Estates agreed to leave themselves defenseless, and with the Estates thereby made certain that the Catholics planned forced restitution of ecclesiastical property and probably wholesale forced conversion as well, no peace was possible.
Again, there is no need to detail the events of the war: the north German lands of the Lower Saxon Circle were devastated and ruined together with the loyal lands on which Wallenstein billeted and then moved his army, approaching over 100,000 men, all living off the land. With the north of Germany going up in flames, Catholic Reaction continued to press its gains in the south. Maximilian occupied Upper Austria and the fist of Reaction employed the noose of the hangman to deal with a short-lived revolt against its tyranny. By 1627 all nobles and burgers who refused to convert were forced to emigrate, non-Catholic worship and education was forbidden, attendance at Catholic services and observance of Catholic fasts were imposed on the peasants, non-Catholic books were seized, and all Catholic church property was restored. Violation of the religious laws could bring the death penalty. Parents were not even allowed to instruct their own children in the truths of their faith. In Lower Austria Ferdinand himself ordered the expulsion of some non-Catholics, closed their churches, and in 1627 expelled the remaining non-Catholic clergy and teachers. All this he did in spite of the fact that he had promised the free exercise of religion to the nobility who had done homage to him in 1620. He salved his ever selective and tender conscience with the thought that he had not actually forbidden the practice of their religion -- he had only made it impossible.48

The desultory Danish phase of the Thirty Years' War was allowed to drag on until 1629, by which time the Lower Saxon Circle was all but totally demoralized by both the Danish army and those of Tilly and Wallenstein. With much of his army quartered in Brandenburg, demanding not only food and drink from the peasants but clothing and shoes as well, that principality too lay in ruins. The brave Calvinist Elector had fled his Lutheran Electorate and gone
to relatively safer Prussia, appealing in vain as he ran, that the Emperor remember that he was an ally not an enemy. In May of 1629 the Peace of Lübeck brought the capitulation of the victimized Lutherans of Lower Saxony and ended the war at their expense, just as the war had been waged at their expense.

Powerless, the Lutheran Estates looked on as outsiders, while the banner of the Catholic Reaction, either through the free-booters of Wallenstein and Ferdinand or through the army of Tilly and Maximilian, were unfurled across Germany. The only political efforts to resist the Catholic tyranny which was destroyed piece-meal the German liberties (on which the rights of the non-Catholic churches depended) would have to come from the Catholic princes of the League. But they were crying at cross purposes, beginning in 1627; on the one hand they saw the opportunity of seizing bishoprics and estates that had been secularized since 1555, and wanted to grab them either for reasons of greed or for genuine devotion to the Reaction on the march; on the other hand, even Maximilian was getting nervous about the Emperor's independence from any constraints to his will, now that he had Wallenstein's free-booters to do his bidding. It, again, was a sorry time for the Lutherans: their best and only hope for a restoration of their promised liberties was to be found in a falling out among the thieves!\(^49\)

But not yet could that saving falling out take place. First the Catholic Reaction had to have its ultimate victory: The Edict of Restitution. The timing of the Edict demonstrates well the political sagacity of the Emperor and gives the lie to the view held from that time to this that Ferdinand really was not very shrewd; even the Spanish ambassador thought him the instrument of his general, Wallenstein. (One cannot but wonder if perhaps the ambassador's thoughts were more an expression of pique that Ferdinand wasn't the instrument of Spain.) Ferdinand prepared the ground well for the Edict which would
be the realization of the worst fears of the non-Catholics. Within the shrine of his own mind there existed the happy marriage between his devotion to the Catholic Reaction and his zeal for the aggrandizement of his own House. While the fruit of that marriage was to be found in the many tears of his subjects, it was evidence to the Emperor that he lived under the signal blessing of the Most High. By 1627 he had established a virtual autocracy in the hereditary lands bordering the Empire; the rights of the Estates in both Upper and Lower Austria were in shreds; the constitution of Bohemia had been re-written, so that its crown was no longer elective but hereditary, and its Estates were now dependent on the crown in a way unheard of an unimaginable a scant ten years before. Of course, the lands were in ruins, the fields untilled and the roads more clogged with the feet of refugees than the wheels of commerce. But what did that matter: the land was free of heresy, never mind the cost and the devil take the exiles -- 150,000 from Bohemia alone!

Nor did the chicken entrails and the stars augur less favorably, in the Empire itself. When elected Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand found himself dependent on Maximilian and on the despised Lutheran "heretics" to rid himself of the even more despised Calvinist heretics. But behold the transformation since then: the Calvinists were quaking in the north of Germany and had already been exterminated in the Palatinate as they had been in Bavaria and in a number of the Imperial cities, and the Lutherans who had not been eliminated were of no more consequence politically than a mosquito, which he could crush under his thumb whenever he wished; for the Lutheran Estates in the Lower Saxon Circle were occupied by the troops of Tilly and Wallenstein, as were the lands of the Lutheran Elector, his ally, Saxon John George, and the Lutheran lands of the Calvinist Elector of Brandenburg, George William. Nor need the Emperor concern himself over much with the only remaining center of power in Germany, Maximilian, newly made Elector Palatine; for Maximilian had
helped him tear up the constitution, and was now in no position morally to become the champion of the German liberties. Nor was he in any position to compete militarily; for Maximilian's army under Tilly was confined to billet in the poorest lands, already picked clean several times over, and was accordingly plagued with pestilence and desertions. But in 1628 the Emperor could meet his own general in Brandeis and hear from Wallenstein the glad tidings that his army could live off of the conquered territories for another six years without costing the always broke House of Hapsburg a pfennig — again, never mind the cost in misery and lives to the accursed peasants, burgers, and nobles of the German lands, heresy infested as they were; their impoverishment and death could only be gain.

But what use is it to be omnipotent, if the impotent do not acknowledge it? The time had come for such an acknowledgement. The dias for the enthronement of the House of Hapsburg was to be the Kurfürstenrat, the occasion, the election of Ferdinand (III) as King of the Romans, heir apparent to the crown of the Holy Roman Empire. There was but one fly to spoil the ointment; Maximilian. Having obtained all that he wanted from his alliance with the Emperor, owning no more scruples about the constitution than did Ferdinand, and in possession of at least as much cunning, Maximilian was growing ever more uncomfortable with the nearly unassailable power of Ferdinand in Germany. The old Elector of Mainz, John Schweikard, had long ago seen the danger; but now his successor had been rendered susceptible to imperialist pressure by the occupation of his lands by Wallenstein's omnipresent army. The Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, of course, had been painfully aware of the danger as well, but were powerless to do anything about it. Nevertheless, the Elector of Mainz served the Emperor with a manifesto declaring that the could not assure the election of Ferdinand III, so long as Wallenstein continued as commander of the Imperial army. Showing not the least regard for
the constitution, Ferdinand had granted his general a patent in March, 1628, making his Duke of Mecklenburg. Europe was shocked; the princes were outraged; the Electors were frightened. But as the Electors met in Mühlhausen, their own deep divisions made the prospects of united action against Ferdinand problematical at best: the ecclesiastical princes wanted the victories of the League and the Emperor to be pressed in the service of the Reaction, John George had growing fears of the Reaction and had protested the disregard of the constitution in the elevation of both Maximilian to the Electorate and Wallenstein to the duchy of Mecklenburg, and Maximilian's fears for the constitution he himself had so recklessly disregarded were being placated by fresh breaches of the constitution: he had just been invested with the right bank of the Rhine and the Upper Palatinate in hereditary possession; both Brandenburg and Saxony were complaining bitterly about the illegal quartering of Wallenstein's army on their territories, and their consequent despoilation.50

So the year 1629 began with Ferdinand intent on the acknowledgement of his omnipotence by way of the election of his son as King of the Romans. The time had come for a dramatic gesture which would make all resistance futile and absurd, a gesture and more to fully satisfy the ambitions of the House and the dreams of both the most fanatical and the most greedy of the reactionaries. The peace of the grave enveloped all centers of trouble in the hereditary lands, and the Peace of Lübeck invited the Emperor to walk over the dead in Germany for the funeral of the German liberties and the remaining rights of the heretics. Ignoring the divided Kurfürstenrat, pretending that the Reichstag had no existence in reality, sweeping away with the stroke of the pen all of the cases pending in the Reichskammergericht and the Reichshofrate, the Emperor Ferdinand II on his own authority signed the Edict of Restitution on March 6, 1629. Constitutionally the implications of the Edict were even more significant than its early shattering provisions. We need therefore to examine its provisions carefully.
The Emperor declared in the Edict:

We, Ferdinand, by the grace of God, Holy Roman Emperor, etc., are determined for the realization both of the religious and profane peace to despatch our Imperial commissioners into the Empire; to re-claim all the archbishoprics, bishoprics, prelacies, monasteries, hospitals and endowments which the Catholics had possessed at the time of the Treaty of Passau [1552] and of which they have been illegally deprived; and to put into all these Catholic foundations duly qualified persons so that each may get his proper due. We herewith declare that the Religious Peace [1555] refers only to the Augsburg Confession as it was submitted to our ancestor Emperor Charles V on 25 June 1530; and that all other doctrines and sects, whatever names they may have, not included in the Peace are forbidden and cannot be tolerated. We therefore command to all and everybody under punishment of the religious and the land ban that they shall at once cease opposing our ordinance and carry it out in their lands and territories and also assist our commissioners. Such as hold the archbishoprics and bishoprics, prelacies, monasteries, hospitals, etc., shall forthwith return them to our Imperial commissioners with all their appurtenances. Should they not carry out this behest they will not only expose themselves to the Imperial ban and to the immediate loss of all their privileges and rights without any further sentence or condemnation, but to the inevitable real execution of that order and be distrained by force. 51

Gone were the promises made by the League, including its ecclesiastical princes, to Saxony and the Saxon Circles that force would not be used to drive them out of their possessions. Gone were the promises of the Emperor that he had no intention of depriving Lutherans of their possessions or of using the power won by Saxon arms against the Lutherans, or of persecuting Lutherans in any way. To be sure, the Edict recognized the Lutheran religion as legal, but at the same time robbed Lutherans of their political and long accepted rights in the ecclesiastical sees scattered throughout the Lutherans' lands, Saxony included. Gone was the promise of the Wahlcapitulation that no one would be placed under the ban without a hearing. Gone was the promise to consult the Electors and/or the Diet before making any changes in the government or possessions of the Reich.
While the ecclesiastical princes and electors together with Maximilian had been calling for such an edict since the Peace of Lübeck, and had thus joined in the destruction of the constitution, they too were dealt a blow by the Edict. Expecting to be put in immediate control of estates and institutions which had passed to other hands within the past 110 years, the League had a rude awakening: the Edict put everything into the hands of the Emperor for his eventual disposition, and the enjoyment for his House of the revenues of these vast territories until their disposition! There followed the unseemly loud and public quarrels over which thieves would get what spoil. The Jesuits wanted what could no longer be absorbed by orders long since reduced or vanished as a result of the Reformation. Ferdinand was determined to take as much as he could for his own relatives, especially the Archduke Leopold, whose lands as a result of the Edict would be among the most extensive inside of Germany, and thus a threat to all princes, Catholic or not. Maximilian, who had seen and approved the Edict in 1628 was having second thoughts about it now that it was being implemented, not least because he was not getting all the spoils he had expected, but perhaps most of all because of the equation that was beginning to sink into his counting house mind: if Ferdinand can do this, what can he not do? — an independent Emperor could just as easily ruin the Wittelsbach House as he already had so many others.

It is difficult for us to imagine the horror and the chaos among the Lutherans and the Calvinists, as the troops of Wallenstein poured out over Germany. Even before the publication of the Edict, Archduke-Bishop Leopold had made clear to all what was about to happen: he seized the small Imperial town of Elsass and, after taking the land, forced the conversion of its inhabitants to Catholicism. Famous and beloved to the Lutherans, the cities of Magdeburg and Augsburg stood in immediate peril. Magdeburg had